A validation metrics framework for safety-critical software-intensive systems by Cruickshank, Kristian John.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-03
A validation metrics framework for
safety-critical software-intensive systems
Cruickshank, Kristian John.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
A VALIDATION METRICS FRAMEWORK FOR SAFETY-








 Thesis Advisor:   James B. Michael 
 Thesis Co-Advisor: Man-Tak Shing 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  A Validation Metrics Framework for Safety-Critical 
Software-Intensive Systems  
6. AUTHOR(S)  Kristian John Cruickshank 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Validation of safety-critical software requirements is a difficult and frequently misunderstood task. It 
answers the question of “are we building the right product?” and is essential to Software Engineering. 
However, validation is often confused with verification activities, or simply left as a final tick-in-the-box just 
prior to delivery. Current models for validation cannot satisfy the unique aspects of safety-critical software 
where “building the right safety product” is paramount. Software safety requires a new model for validation 
of safety requirements by proxy. The need for a proxy model becomes evident in the software safety 
process, where customer input for safety is reduced to the requirement of “a safe system.” 
This thesis defines a new proactive model for validation of safety-critical software requirements. 
Continuous assessment of validity of safety requirements is indicated by metrics as part of the Validation 
Metrics Framework. The generic framework combines the Goal/Question/Metric Approach with Goal 
Structuring Notation and then specializes in validation of safety-critical software. The metrics are 
measurements of safety products typical to safety-critical software development programs. A fictitious case 
study of a Rapid Action Surface to Air Missile is used to apply the framework, identifying the benefits of a 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
144 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Software Metrics, Safety Metrics, Validation Metrics, Metrics 
Framework, Validation, Safety-Critical Software, Software Engineering, Goal Question Metric, 
Goal Structuring Notation  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Kristian John Cruickshank 
Flight Lieutenant, Royal Australian Air Force 
BEng(Elec)(Hons), Central Queensland University, 2004 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Peter J. Denning 
Chairman, Department of Computer Science 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Validation of safety-critical software requirements is a difficult and 
frequently misunderstood task. It answers the question of “are we building the 
right product?” and is essential to Software Engineering. However, validation is 
often confused with verification activities, or simply left as a final tick-in-the-box 
just prior to delivery. Current models for validation cannot satisfy the unique 
aspects of safety-critical software where “building the right safety product” is 
paramount. Software safety requires a new model for validation of safety 
requirements by proxy. The need for a proxy model becomes evident in the 
software safety process, where customer input for safety is reduced to the 
requirement of “a safe system.” 
This thesis defines a new proactive model for validation of safety-critical 
software requirements. Continuous assessment of validity of safety requirements 
is indicated by metrics as part of the Validation Metrics Framework. The generic 
framework combines the Goal/Question/Metric Approach with Goal Structuring 
Notation and then specializes in validation of safety-critical software. The metrics 
are measurements of safety products typical to safety-critical software 
development programs. A fictitious case study of a Rapid Action Surface to Air 
Missile is used to apply the framework, identifying the benefits of a proactive, 
indicative, validation technique utilizing a metrics framework. 
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Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that 
counts can be counted.  
    — Albert Einstein 
A. OVERVIEW 
As software engineers endeavor to design and build increasingly complex 
software systems, development and management techniques require 
commensurate levels of research to sufficiently cater for these increases. The 
role of software in safety-critical systems continues to grow in varying industries 
and applications; however, the tools used for necessary risk mitigation and 
management are lacking. Safe software is paramount in the defense industry, as 
large-scale weapon systems have the most potential for catastrophic unintended 
consequences. Ensuring that software functions do not contribute to system 
hazards in an unintended manner is largely an exercise of validation—identifying 
correct requirements to sufficiently mitigate hazardous situations. The problem 
addressed by this research is that of identifying invalid requirements for software 
safety. Metrics acting as indicators for validity of software safety requirements 
engender a proactive approach to investigation and identification of potentially 
invalid requirements. 
Measuring the safety of software-intensive systems has only recently been 
investigated. There are currently no tools in existence for measuring the validity 
of software safety requirements. Metrics that indicate the validity of software 
safety are needed to cope with modern day safety-critical systems. 
Validation of software safety requirements necessitates a new model of 
validation. Chapter III proposes a new model for validation of safety 
requirements, focussing on sufficiency of hazard identification, hazard analysis, 
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and software safety requirements traceability, as a proxy for validation. This 
model forms the core of the proposed Validation Metrics Framework. 
At present very little information exists on the use of metrics for the 
purpose of measuring safety. Even less, if any, information can be obtained on 
metrics for validation. Discussion on what validation metrics are, and how best to 
use them, is given throughout this thesis. By combining two popular software 
development tools (GQM and GSN) we have created a goal-based framework 
identifying a core set of metrics to aid in validating software safety requirements 
of safety-critical software-intensive systems.  
The research and development of this thesis has resulted in a metric 
framework for validation of safety-critical software-intensive systems. There is 
currently no notion of validation metrics in open literature, much less a framework 
identifying purpose, application, and boundaries of the metric set. 
Chapter II provides background information necessary to understand the 
context and overall direction of this thesis. It analyzes the current environment of 
software validation and identifies the gaps that exist when considering safety-
critical software. This chapter defines the problem to be resolved. 
Chapter III further explores the concept of validation of software safety 
requirements, identifying a new validation model. This chapter introduces a 
framework for validation metrics. It also introduces the core building-block of the 
framework—the Goal/Question/Metric (GQM) process for systematically 
identifying metrics. 
Chapter IV details the development of the metric framework. The 
combination of GQM and Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) results in a hybrid 
goal-driven metric derivation specification language. Discussion of the purpose 
and boundaries of the framework is also given. The framework goal structure is 
developed along with questions and subsequent metrics. This chapter presents 
the proposed Validation Metrics Framework. 
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Chapter V investigates application of the Validation Metrics Framework 
through case study. The case study uses the Rapid Action Surface-to-Air Missile 
System (RASAM) as a representative fictitious safety-critical software-intensive 
system.  
Chapter VI discusses the results of the Validation Metrics Framework and 
future work needing to be undertaken to further its utility and application. 
 4




As software complexity continues to increase in major defense systems, 
conveyance of stakeholder requirements, development to these requirements, 
and validation of these requirements has become exceedingly more difficult. This 
rate of growth in difficulty seems to be disproportionate to the techniques and 
methods that are used to ensure that the systems are developed to customer 
requirements and expectation. Safety-critical software-intensive systems require 
significant verification to ensure that they function as per requirements. 
Verification is only one portion of ensuring systems function correctly and is 
typically a well defined activity for software development. Validation is the other 
portion of ensuring that software is developed to the customer’s satisfaction; 
however, is not so well defined. In the U.S. more software projects are cancelled 
due to incomplete requirements than any other factor.1 Verification does not 
address this shortfall. Validation is the key tool to ensuring stakeholder 
requirements are sufficiently explored and met by the developed product. 
Software metrics have typically been applied in the verification dimension 
because software validation was not well defined or understood. As software 
validation grows in maturity, so does its definition, tools, and techniques, 
including means for measuring the validation activity, its outputs, and impact on 
development. Software metrics are measurements of quality in product, project 
or process. They are used to make informed decisions about a particular aspect 
of a software project. Without measurement, there is no control. To effectively 
control software validation, it needs to be measured and presented through 
metrics. 
                                            
1 The Standish Group CHAOS Report, 1995. 
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This chapter provides the background information necessary for the 
following research. It identifies key definitions for safety-critical software-intensive 
systems, metrics, validation, and validation metrics, all necessary for 
understanding the context of this thesis. The current problem with validation will 
be described and the focus of this thesis will be defined. 
B. SAFETY-CRITICAL SOFTWARE-INTENSIVE SYSTEM 
1. Definition 
MIL-STD-882D [1] defines safety as “Freedom from those conditions that 
can cause death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or 
property, or damage to the environment.” 
Further, it also defines safety-critical as “A term applied to a condition, 
event, operation, process, or item of whose proper recognition, control, 
performance or tolerance is essential to safe system operation or use.” 
The Joint Services Software System Safety Handbook [2] defines safety-
critical computer software components as “Those computer software 
components and units whose errors can result in a potential hazard or loss of 
predictability or control of a system.” 
In general terms, safety-critical software is software whose function either 
directly or indirectly influences a hazard or hazardous situation. 
A software-intensive system is “a system where software represents a 
significant segment in system functionality, cost, development risk, or 
development time.” [3] 
Safety-critical software-intensive systems are those software-based 
systems that control, or provide input to, safety-critical (hazardous) applications.  
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2. Overview 
Safety-critical software-intensive systems are becoming ubiquitous. Most 
modern aircraft are safety-critical software-intensive systems, as are many 
nuclear power stations, modern automotive systems, and even pre-tensioners on 
seatbelts. They rely on software for safe operation. Software systems are also 
continually growing in complexity at an increasing rate. Examples of this 
increasing complexity can be found in many modern day weapon systems that 
rely on a system-of-systems implementation to function. The web of relationships 
between individual systems comprising the complete system-of-systems 
becomes difficult to understand and analyze and will result in emergent behavior 
not considered in the stand-alone system. The safety-criticality of the software 
used in these systems can be overlooked, because software itself is not 
hazardous. Software is virtual—it cannot cause death, injury, occupational 
illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the 
environment. However, software is often directly responsible for the actions of 
hardware that can have unsafe effects. 
Safety is a system property. Software cannot be analyzed for safety 
independent of the physical system it will control or influence. Even in the case of 
a pure software system, safety-critical decisions could be made based on the 
data it presents. Safety still remains a property of the system. Therefore, safety-
critical software must be analyzed in the context of a software-intensive system.  
C. VALIDATION 
1. Definition 
IEEE Std 1012-2004 [4] defines validation as: 
the process of providing evidence that the software and its 
associated products satisfy system requirements allocated to 




problem (e.g., correctly model physical laws, implement business 
rules, use proper system assumptions), and satisfy intended use 
and user needs. 
A more generic definition of validation is “the steps and the process 
needed to ensure that the system configuration, as designed, meets all 
requirements initially specified by the customer.” [5] 
The latter definition allows for more flexibility in the interpretation of 
validation; it answers the question of “Are we providing what the customer 
wants?” However, both definitions assume the existence of correct requirements 
and focus on the concept of building the right product as defined by these 
requirements. 
2. Overview 
Software validation has always been problematic in software engineering. 
Unlike many other engineered products, software often cannot be visualized, 
thus, in many cases, resulting in software validation being a reactive last minute 
process. It is hard for validation to be a continuous process throughout 
development as with many physical systems when there is no physical product to 
monitor. The ultimate validation of software systems is effectively the operational 
evaluation of the system by the user, and often this is where validation of the 
system is relegated. The IEEE definition lends itself to this approach as it focuses 
on the satisfaction of requirements through testing. Quite simply, validation of 
software has not had the same rigorous research and development of processes 
as other areas of software engineering, particularly verification. A simple search2 
of the IEEE Xplore database for articles with software and validation in the 
abstract reveals sixty articles. The same search for software and verification 
shows 110 articles. Validation is a relatively misunderstood process. As a result 
of this, of the sixty articles found, roughly 30% address the essence of validation 
                                            
2 IEEE Xplore Database, accessed 07 Jun 2008. 
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as discussed below.3 Most of the articles mistakenly combine verification and 
validation as one element, term verification as validation, or confuse assurance 
and quality activities as validation. Although this is a very simplified example, it 
does help to portray the seriousness of what is a critical aspect of software 
engineering.  
The software engineering discipline has become competent in the area of 
verification. We can build portions of systems to their applicable specifications 
with relative success. However, we still build systems that do not meet 
customer’s expectations and requirements. One of the key tools to address this 
situation is validation. Significant efforts afforded to software validation are now a 
priority for software engineering. More proactive, rather than the typical reactive, 
solutions are being sought. The IEEE definition of validation indicates that it is a 
process to be carried out at the end of each phase (or lifecycle activity); however, 
this should only be the finalization, or completion, of validation. The validation 
process should be a proactive and continuous process to be carried out prior to, 
and in parallel with, the development and verification activities with closure at the 
end of each phase. 
Although validation focuses on ensuring that initial customer requirements 
are met, there is more to validation than meets the eye. Validation is required 
whenever a requirements derivation process occurs (i.e., a translation of 
requirements from one domain to another). An example of this is taking a 
customer’s requirements in their natural language and translating them into a 
specification. The specification needs to be validated to ensure that it maps back 
to the cognitive understanding of the stakeholders who originally supplied the 
requirements [6]. To ensure the traceability of products for validation, the 
validation process is ongoing throughout the development cycle whenever this 
translation of requirements takes place. Any higher-level requirement being 
                                            
3 Thirty percent is an optimistic estimate. Roughly 10 of the 60 articles did not concern 
validation of software; rather they addressed validation of hardware systems through the use of 
software models. 
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translated to a lower-level requirement requires a validation process to ensure 
that the products of the lower-level requirements are indeed valid. In contrast, 
verification is defined as “The process of evaluating a system or component to 
determine whether the products of a given development phase satisfy the 
conditions imposed at the start of that phase. [7] 
The key difference between validation and verification is that verification 
simply ensures that requirements for a given phase are met. Validation ensures 
that overall customer requirements (i.e., customer expectations) are met. There 
is somewhat of an overlap in validation and verification processes, particularly 
when considering either process in the “middle-levels” of abstraction. They are in 
fact processes orthogonal to one another. In its purest form, validation ensures 
that customer expectations are met; failure to meet these expectations 
(assuming they are constant throughout the project) indicates a failure in the 
validation process. Figure 1 shows graphically how verification and validation 
contrast. 
 
Figure 1.   The Verification and Validation Process 
 
 11
The end-result of any validation process should be actionable data 
presented as feedback to the many different customers, or stakeholders, of the 
system. This effectively creates a feedback loop from any stage in the 




IEEE Std 610.12-1990 [7] defines a metric as “a quantitative measure of 
the degree to which a system, component or process possesses a given 
attribute.” 
Further, a software quality metric is “A function whose inputs are software 
data and whose output is a single numerical value that can be interpreted as the 
degree to which the software possesses a given quality attribute. [7] 
Software metrics are therefore quantitative measurements of either 
product (system or component), process, or even project (in this case software 
projects) indicating the quality of a desired attribute. However, software metrics 
can be concerned with more than just quantitative measurements. Since we are 
measuring quality of product, process, or project, qualitative aspects must be 
considered. Metrics can also be qualitative in nature. 
2. Overview 
For the purpose of this thesis, metrics are measurements of quality. In 
most well established engineering disciplines candidate measurement attributes 
are well understood. Software engineering is one of the disciplines outside of the 
“most” category. Software engineering is a young engineering discipline and as 
such does not have the hundreds of years of empirical scientific foundation as 
other core engineering disciplines. Partly due to this fact, many measures of 
software are not well understood or are ill-defined.  
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Measurement: 
in the most general sense, is the mapping of numbers to attributes 
of objects in accordance with some prescribed rule… The mapping 
must preserve intuitive and empirical observations about the 
attributes and entities [8]. 
Empirical observation requires experimentation. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, for a software metric to be valid it must be based on empirical 
observation through experimentation, whether qualitative or quantitative. 
Often with software development, the single best metric is sought. Given 
the above definitions, such an approach comes across as foolish. An engineered 
product cannot be properly understood purely through the application of one 
measurement. A single software metric can only present a single view of a 
software product. Multiple metrics are required to sufficiently understand a 
product or process. Knowing a car’s weight gives no indication of overall 
performance, it is only one piece of the picture. It is also possible that the 
gathered metric does not answer a question of interest or provide any decision-
support value. The same is true for software. 
Many definitions of metrics require them to be quantitative. However, 
many qualitative measures of product, process, or project are also valid. 
Consider a fast car. The “fast” attribute indicates its relative quality. It is a 
qualitative metric, understood in a qualitative manner. Qualitative metrics are 
relative to some quantitative measure; however, exact position on the 
quantitative scale may not be possible with the given data due to the use of a 
weak ordering. A qualitative metric still provides relevant indication of quality. 
This is an important aspect of metrics for software since the abstract nature of 
software can often preclude quantitative measures of certain quality attributes. 
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E. VALIDATION METRICS 
1. Overview 
Many of the metrics currently used in software engineering focus on 
verification aspects of the software process or product. These metrics are 
concerned with measurements that ensure requirements for particular phases 
are met. Metrics such as fault density, test coverage, etc., are typically used for 
verification purposes as they focus on given requirements. Just as there are 
measurements for all different aspects of a physical machine—metal density, 
fatigue rating, size, safe working load, etc.—software products need to be 
described through different types of metrics. Validation metrics are 
measurements of product from the aspect of fulfilling customer requirements and 
expectations. 
Validation metrics must focus on measurements that can be used for the 
validation process. Since validation is concerned with ensuring that the 
customers requirements and expectations are met (building the right product), 
validation metrics should tie back to the most abstract requirements in some way. 
In essence, validation metrics should provide measures of software quality, 
indicating the fulfillment of customer requirements, to the customer as actionable 
data. Verification metrics and validation metrics should be complimentary, i.e., 
they should both contribute to the overall understanding of the system, but they 
will focus on distinctly different aspects of the system. 
According to Munson [8], measurements can be divided into two 
categories for software engineering: primitive and derived. Primitive metrics are 
presupposed by no other, they are direct measurements of product attributes. 
There are no assumptions made by primitive metrics to arrive at their result. On 
the other hand, derived metrics are those that are not direct measurements. They 
are derived from assumptions or a combination of metrics. McCabe’s Cyclomatic 
Complexity is an example of a derived metric. Although the underlying attributes 
of Cyclomatic Complexity (number of edges, nodes and connected components) 
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are primitive metrics (although in a virtual sense), the end result (Cyclomatic 
Complexity) is a derived metric. Caution must be taken when dealing with 
derived metrics. In a sense, the adage of “adding apples to oranges” is of 
concern. Because many primitive metrics of software will be based on something 
that is not physical, it can be quite tempting to combine primitive metrics that may 
in fact have no relationship. As validation metrics will typically be more abstract 
than verification metrics, in the sense that the validation of the metric itself relies 
on abstract software artifacts, this issue must be sufficiently managed. Derived 
validation metrics require significant forethought and analysis to ensure that they 
do not portray invalid measurements. 
F. RELATED WORK 
As discussed above, software validation has not been afforded the same 
levels of research and development as many other aspects of software 
engineering. As such, there is little literature addressing the concept of validation 
metrics. In fact, an extensive search of the ACM and IEEE Xplore databases 
revealed no published literature on metrics for the purpose of validation. The 
following paragraphs, however, detail some of the more recent advances on 
metrics and validation that aid in the formation of a validation metrics framework. 
1. Metrics 
Whalen, Rajan, Heimdahl, and Miller [9] present a new coverage metric 
for requirements-based testing. They define the Unique First Cause (UFC) metric 
that determines coverage of high-level formal requirements. The method utilized 
allows for automatic generation of test cases based on high-level requirements, 
and a by-product of these test cases is the coverage metric. Whalen et al. claim 
that the UFC metric provides “objective, implementation-independent measures 
of how well a black box test suite exercises a set of requirements.” 
The results of the case study are encouraging, and the independence of 
implementation would aid in the overall independent verification aspect of many 
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safety-critical systems. However, Whalen et al. claim that the metric “integrates 
and crosschecks several of the verification and validation activities.” 
Although the metric is certainly useful for verification, there is no indication 
that it provides actionable data back to the customers and stakeholders based on 
their requirements. It does link back to the highest-level formal requirements, 
remaining independent of any implementation-specific requirements, but does 
not make the necessary link back to customer requirements for it to be 
considered validation at the highest level. The translation from user 
documentation detailing their requirements and expectations to the formal 
requirements indicates that there is still a gap to be bridged back to the highest-
level requirements. 
Tasiran and Keutzer [10] detail a number of different coverage metrics for 
the use of functional validation of hardware design. They provide an extensive list 
of coverage metrics that can be used for software simulation models of hardware 
designs. By utilizing software simulations Tasiran and Keutzer claim that 
“Coverage metrics ensure the optimal use of simulation resources, measure the 
completeness of validation, and direct simulations toward unexplored areas of 
the design.” 
The context of this “validation” needs to be explained to fully understand 
why this form of validation may be applicable to hardware design in this domain, 
but generally not for software-intensive systems. There is a distinct difference 
between most customers of commercially developed hardware and safety-critical 
software-intensive systems. Essentially, for the hardware systems that Tasiran 
and Keutzer are dealing with, the customers are the developers. There may be a 
level of independence within their organization, however the organization as a 
collective ultimately decides upon the behavior of the hardware and how it will be 
designed. The domain barrier between customer and developer is somewhat 
blurred and it is likely that the customer, in this context, is able to “speak” in the 
language of the developer. There is no major language translation; therefore, 
formal software models of the hardware products do provide actionable data 
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back to the customer when utilizing common software verification metrics. The 
same is not true for most safety-critical software-intensive systems. Any models 
of the software-intensive systems that are to be used for validation must be 
sufficiently abstract such that the customers and stakeholders are able to 
understand and act upon data directly from that model. 
The metrics that Tasiran and Keutzer present are in fact the typical 
verification metrics used throughout the software development process. As with 
the Whalen et al. paper, these metrics do not provide customers and 
stakeholders of safety-critical software-intensive systems with actionable data 
based on their requirements. 
2. Validation Models 
Pingree et al. [11] expand on current software modeling techniques for the 
validation of mission-critical software design and implementation by focusing on 
software models consisting of statecharts.  The process provides an independent 
understanding of the system being designed by creating a statechart 
specification from which all “validation” steps are taken. In effect, the statechart 
specification acts as a reference model for the remaining development. Through 
this method, Pingree et al. claim, “we are now able to specify and validate 
portions of mission critical software design and implementation using exhaustive 
exploration techniques.” 
However, there is no mention of feedback to the customers and 
stakeholders. Statecharts provide a necessary higher layer of abstraction for 
complex systems, but the focus on this technique is model correctness, not 
customer feedback, (i.e., validation). It serves as a model for validation in the 
following phases of development, and does aid in presenting a model that 
customers and stakeholders are more easily able to comprehend; however, the 
customer feedback portion is still not clearly identified. Rather than using 
traditional testing techniques to verify the design once the product is complete, a 
pro-active approach is being taken to ensure that the developer’s understanding 
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of the design is correctly implemented (essentially building the right product from 
the designer’s point of view through to the implementation) and that no critical 
design errors are made. Design errors in this sense focus on correctness through 
exhaustive model exploration, not necessarily building “the right product.” This 
technique still has a high level of focus on building “the product right,” i.e., 
verification. 
Drusinsky et al. [6] present a framework for computer-aided validation for 
use by Independent Validation and Verification (IV&V) teams. This technique 
focuses on an executable System Reference Model (SRM) using formal 
assertions to specify mission and safety-critical behaviors. The SRM is 
independent of the actual system under development and the focus of the paper 
is on the IV&V team as the customer, or stakeholder, for validation purposes. It is 
a pro-active approach to ensuring the IV&V team has a firm understanding of the 
desired system behavior both prior to and during development of the system. 
Drusinsky et al. state:  
The IV&V team’s independent requirements effort should develop a 
description of the necessary attributes, characteristics, and qualities 
of any system developed to solve the problem and satisfy the 
intended use and user needs. The IV&V team must ensure that 
their cognitive understanding of the problem and the requirements 
for any system solving the problem are correct before performing 
IV&V on developer-produced systems. 
Hence, the focus of this technique is on customer and stakeholder 
requirements. The SRM consists of use cases, Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) artifacts and formal assertions derived from the user requirements to 
describe the behaviors of the system. By focusing on the UML artifacts and high-
level use cases, the IV&V team is ensuring that customer requirements are 
central to developing their understanding of the system through statechart 
assertions. The assertions are created from reified high-level user requirements 
and implemented in code to assess predictions of how the system should and 
should not behave. Thus, there is a one-to-one mapping between each reified 
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user requirement and its corresponding assertion. This approach allows not only 
the IV&V team to validate the model of requirements, but also the requirements 
posed by the stakeholders. 
This technique assists in validation primarily from the perspective of the 
IV&V team. Validation from the different customer and stakeholder perspectives 
can vary depending on their level of involvement in development and 
understanding of different techniques used. However, the framework does form a 
firm grounding for subsequent validation metrics for IV&V and will also contribute 
for validation metrics for other customer and stakeholder domains. Providing 
metric data back to the customers and stakeholders through use of the SRM 
approach will further ensure that the validation loop is correctly carried out. 
G. THE PROBLEM 
Safety-critical software-intensive systems are becoming increasingly 
complex as technical boundaries are overcome and each prior level of 
complexity (in terms of functional dependencies, relationships and difficulty of 
requirements validation) is better understood. However, with each increase in 
engineering ability comes further complexity and potential ambiguity between 
customers/stakeholders and developers, which is currently not being sufficiently 
dealt with. Validation is the key tool for ensuring that systems are developed in 
accordance with the requirements of customers and stakeholders. Validation is 
only one tool for battling the complexity issue by ensuring that “the right product 
is built.” However, how do we measure the effectiveness of validation, or provide 
metrics to aid in the validation process? Very little, if any, research exists for the 
application of metrics for validation purposes. Without metrics for validation, 
estimates of success are very subjective. Software engineering requires that as 
little subjectivity as possible be introduced when dealing with the validation of 
safety-critical software-intensive systems—validation metrics are one tool for 
reducing that subjectivity. Metrics as feedback to customers and stakeholders 
are essential in ensuring that the system is correctly understood, particularly in 
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hazardous applications. Combined with proactive validation techniques (rather 
than using operational evaluation as the “tick-in-the-box”), such as the SRM 
approach, validation metrics will aid in the validation process to increase the 
likelihood of successful development of the right software-intensive systems. 
Software safety in itself is highly subjective in nature when considering 
validation. Often the safety of a system cannot be tied back to customer 
expectations or requirements, other than the fact that they wish to have a safe 
system. Traceability and validity of software safety requirements requires a 
different approach to validation than the traditional matching of system 
specification to customer expectations and requirements. 
The following chapters will detail measurable characteristics of the 
validation process for safety-critical software-intensive systems and present 
guidelines for a validation metrics framework. The goal of this framework will be 
to provide actionable data to customers and stakeholders for the purpose of 
validating safety artifacts. 
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III. VALIDATION METRICS FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter introduced the concept of validation metrics and 
provided the background information necessary to understand the scope of this 
thesis. This chapter will further analyze the validation metric concept to 
determine required characteristics and define the objectives of a framework 
necessary to identify applicable existing metrics or the characteristics of new 
metrics. Artifacts suitable for feedback to the necessary stakeholders will also be 
examined as part of the framework. The chapter will focus on safety-critical 
software-intensive systems. However, development of a framework for validation 
metrics is not limited to this scope. 
B. VALIDATION AUDIENCE 
To successfully analyze and define the characteristics that a validation 
metrics framework must possess, a more in-depth look at validation is required. 
The previous chapter detailed the broad concept of validation; however, there is 
again more to be realized, particularly when considering the intended validation 
audience. 
1. Relevance of Data 
As mentioned previously, validation is mandatory whenever a 
requirements translation process takes place. A validation process is successful 
when a reverse-translation of requirements occurs, and the originator of the 
requirements can validate the subsequent artifact(s). This typically takes place by 
the originator testing the resulting product of the translation and observing 
system behavior. An important key aspect of validation is that it is not restricted 
to the highest level of stakeholders. Indeed a validation process can, and should, 
be applied for every level of translation. However, as the requirements and 
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design are translated further and further from the original stakeholders’ domain, 
the more perplexing and foreign they become. This is one of the key difficulties in 
using formal methods4 as the sole vehicle for conducting validation. The intended 
users and high-level stakeholders cannot understand the language in which the 
system is being portrayed. Instead, relevant data needs to be extracted and 
presented to the users and high-level stakeholders in simple terms and in the 
language of their domain. Therefore, for any validation technique, relevance of 
data must be determined. The output of a validation metrics framework must 
allow for data to be presented to the intended audience in a meaningful and 
relevant manner. 
2. Users and Stakeholders 
In the previous chapter, validation was presented in terms of customers 
and stakeholders. In reality, customers and stakeholders can be more clearly 
defined as users and stakeholders. Users concerned with the validation of a 
safety-critical software-intensive system are primarily the recipient of the system, 
with pre-determined expectations based on their conveyed requirements. They 
are usually easily identifiable and are the ultimate “validator” of the system. 
However, the realm of stakeholders can be difficult to bound and can be involved 
at many levels of system development. In this thesis, stakeholders can be 
defined as “other than user.” Essentially every person involved in the 
development of the system is a stakeholder. Therefore, stakeholder requirements 
and expectations will also have a validation aspect to them, which will not 
necessarily be the same as that of the user. Based on this, an addition to Figure 
1 is required to more accurately reflect validation. This line of thought is 
equivalent to that used in Barry Boehm’s WinWin Spiral Process Model [13], 
whereby different stakeholders are identified for different levels of development. 
Particularly in the case of contractor developed software-intensive systems, a 
                                            
4 Mathematically based techniques for describing system properties. For more information 
see [12].  
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validation process is required from one development domain to another. Users 
will often be involved at the lower levels of development, with corresponding 
relevant data, but to ensure traceability of high-level requirements to design and 
validation of these requirements, validation steps must be carried out against 
each intermediate level of requirements. Figure 2 shows the additional validation 
pathways that can occur throughout the development of a software-intensive 
system. In this figure, it is shown that users/stakeholders are not always 
concerned with the “middle” levels of development; instead, this is left to the 
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Figure 2.   Modified Verification and Validation Process 
 
From the above diagram, it is clear that validation metrics must not only be 
applicable to the users of the system, they must also be relevant to the 
stakeholders of the system. One metric cannot satisfy all the requirements of 
users, auditors, project managers, developers, regulatory bodies, etc. Different 
aspects of product, process and project will be relevant to different people. As 
per the previous section, relevance of data is a key attribute for developing 
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validation metrics. Now armed with a more thorough understanding of validation, 
where it exists, how it can be used, and who uses it, a framework for identifying 
and developing suitable metrics can be more readily defined.  
3. Intended Audience 
The validation audience does not necessarily include all stakeholders of a 
system. Instead, the validation audience is comprised of those stakeholders 
concerned with ensuring that requirements are correct, according to user 
expectations. This statement in itself is subjective, and often the definition of 
stakeholder can become unbounded as everybody attempts to obtain a stake in 
the system design. However, to bound the scope to a somewhat realistic 
manner, Figure 3 shows a use case diagram for the possible users of a validation 
metrics framework. The Mission Assurance team displayed below is a broader 
group than simply the V&V team as it includes all stakeholders concerned with 
assurance of the system (V&V, IV&V, Auditors, etc.). Operators and owners are 













Figure 3.   Validation Metrics Framework Users 
 
The target audience of this Validation Metrics Framework will be the 
Safety Engineering team (shown in bold). Although the framework will be 
applicable to the other users and stakeholders shown, it will be tailored in this 
instance to the safety engineering team’s domain. Actionable data arising from 
the framework will be primarily specific to the safety engineering team’s scope, 
based on user and stakeholder input in the form of use cases, high-level 
requirements documents, and potentially user feedback on the artifacts produced 
from the framework. However, ultimately validation ends with the operators and 
owners of the system; therefore the safety engineering team will effectively act as 
a proxy for the framework—the metric data must also reveal safety aspects of the 
system to the owners and operators. Developing a framework to a much broader 
application of validation could result in inadequate explanation for application to 
real world scenarios, and therefore will be pursued as future work after 
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successful definition and application in the safety engineering domain. The 
Mission Assurance team (also shown in bold) will effectively be the appliers of 
the framework. They will be responsible for obtaining the metrics data on behalf 
of the safety engineering team. 
C. THE REALITY OF VALIDATION 
Up to this point, validation has been described in idealistic terms. In 
reality, validation cannot exist as an isolated entity. To validate a system requires 
more than just carrying out a “validation” procedure. Validation is essentially the 
culmination of many other development processes. Although it is possible to 
perform these other processes (verification, requirements analyses, etc.) without 
addressing validation, the reverse is not true. Essentially all of these processes, 
including validation, comprise software assurance. By showing that best 
practices for the development of software have been used, and safety of the 
system can be sufficiently argued, the confidence that can be placed in validation 
is increased. A higher level of software assurance assumes a higher integration 
of validation; however, it is often not addressed to the same level as other 
development procedures. Verification is simply required for any system, but in 
terms of validation, verification is an underlying assurance. If requirements can 
be verified through testing at each level of development, there can be more 
confidence placed in the validation process carried out, as it can be assumed 
that stakeholder requirements and expectations are more closely matched to the 
actual developed product.  
Therefore, in the following paragraphs and chapters, validation will not be 
treated as a completely separate entity. Some metrics identified through the 
framework may be considered verification or project metrics (there may not be 
any characteristic that could be identified as “validation”), but they form a crucial 
part in understanding the system from the validation perspective. In this manner, 
it will be possible to leverage metrics that may be collected even without applying 
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a validation metrics framework. However, by applying this framework the existing 
metrics are given more meaning when trying to conduct validation. 
D. SOFTWARE SAFETY 
Safe software, contrary to various opinions and understandings, cannot be 
achieved through software reliability practices [14]. Software reliability is defined 
as “the ability of a system or component to perform its required functions under 
stated conditions for a specified period of time.” [7] 
The focus on reliability is performance according to requirements in terms 
of failure to meet those requirements. Although reliability can be used as an 
indirect indicator of safety, lack of hazard analysis and subsequent safety 
requirements can render this a moot point, as reliability does not mandate safety 
requirements. As discussed by Leveson [14], most safety-critical failures can be 
traced back to incorrect requirements, i.e., a lack of understanding as to what the 
software should do under hazardous conditions. In essence, this falls under the 
validation domain based on stakeholder expectation. Stakeholders expect the 
system to be safe without necessarily providing specifications for safety. As 
further evidence to the validation case Leveson [14] states that, “although coding 
errors often get the most attention, they have more of an effect on reliability and 
other qualities than on safety.” This statement indicates a reliance on verification 
according to requirements, rather than validation according to expectation, as 
being a key quality improvement technique. Validation, again, is not afforded the 
attention it requires. 
Therefore, safety-critical software-intensive systems require a systematic 
metric framework to aid in validation. Although much effort has been afforded to 
developing hazard analysis techniques and hazard reduction techniques (such 
as Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree 
Analysis, etc.), there is little to no evidence that measurements of these 
processes and products are being conducted to aid in answering the question of 
“are we building the right safety product?” (i.e., validation of system safety). 
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Safety requirements can be divided into two categories: generic 
requirements and system specific (or derived) requirements. Generic 
requirements are those recommended in standards, contained in workplace 
procedures, or identified in “lessons learned,” etc. They are essentially good 
practice, based on previously identified common causes leading to known 
hazards, to aid in developing a safer system. Derived requirements are those 
that are realized through the undertaking of hazard analysis and association of 
software functions that may contribute to identified hazards. These derived safety 
requirements may be more specific to the validation of safety-critical software-
intensive systems than any other artifact or product, as high-level user 
documentation often does not provide such detail. 
There are many products and procedures involved in the engineering of a 
safety-critical software-intensive system. Hazard identification, hazard analysis, 
safety-critical software function identification, and verification of safety 
requirements are some of the areas that will need to be considered in the 
development of a validation metrics framework. These products and processes 
will be some of the major foci of the Validation Metrics Framework for safety-
critical software-intensive systems. 
1. Software Hazard Risk Assessment 
Unlike risk assessment for hardware, software risk assessment has 
unique qualities that inhibit the traditional assignment of consequence/severity 
and likelihood/probability. Determining the probabilistic nature of software is a 
hotly debated topic in the software engineering discipline; however, for the 
purpose of this thesis the assumption is made that software failures are 
systematic. That is to say, they are caused by incorrect requirements (design 
errors) or development errors, therefore are systematic in nature and cannot be 
assigned probabilistic failure rates. Although this is contrary to much of the field 
of software reliability, it does allow for the use of many pre-conceived software 
safety tools. 
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Determining the safety risk associated with software requires a different 
approach to hardware. A typical approach5 to determining software risk is to 
determine the software’s level of control over the associated hazard or hazard 
causal factor rather than determining the probability (or likelihood) of a 
hazard/hazard causal factor occurring. Figure 4 shows a Software Hazard 
Criticality Matrix (SHCM) for assessing the risk of software contributing to system 
hazards. 
 
Figure 4.   Software Hazard Criticality Matrix [From [2]] 
 
Figure 4 utilizes the Control Category scheme given by MIL-STD-882C. 
With regards to the Control Category schemes, The Joint Software System 
Safety Handbook [2] states that, “The SSS [Software System Safety] team must 
                                            
5 As given in MIL-STD-882C and RTCA DO-178B. 
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review these lists and tailor them to meet the objectives of the SSP [System 
Safety Program] and software development program.” For the purpose of this 
thesis, the Control Category scheme of MIL-STD-882C, as presented in Figure 4, 
will be assumed. 
The Joint Software System Safety Handbook [2] emphasizes the fact that 
the SHCM is not intended to be used directly as a Hazard Risk Index (HRI) 
matrix. Because it is not possible to assign a probability of occurrence, the risk 
assessment provided by the SHCM is not entirely compatible with the risk 
assessment of a HRI. Instead, the SHCM reflects risk in the unique terms of 
software, indicating a level of rigor required to address the risk level. In some 
cases, the risk level may warrant an alternative solution that does not utilize 
software control. Therefore, when determining hazard risk that includes software 
causal factors, engineering judgment must be applied to determine a level of 
probability, taking into consideration the SHCM rating, the level of rigor applied, 
and the resultant safety measures developed.  
2. Hazard Causal Factors 
Software hazards are in and of themselves causal factors to system 
hazards. As discussed earlier, software cannot create a mishap by itself. 
However, software is often responsible for system functionality that can create 
mishaps. The linkage of system hazards to software hazards (causal factors) 
requires an in-depth understanding of system functionality. Software functionality 
contributing to system hazards is identified as a first-order causal factor. They 
are in themselves hazards, but with further analysis second and even third-order 
causal factors can be revealed. Analysis of software causal-factors beyond first-
order is typically only required for medium- and high-level risks as identified in 
the SHCM. Although this is a generally accepted rule of thumb, and in this thesis 
assumed to be the norm, it may be the case that certain industries, or 
applications of software have determined a different level of analysis. Therefore, 
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any metric framework measuring the depth of software causal factor analysis 
must be tailorable to the different standards of measurement of sufficiency. 
For the purpose of this thesis software hazard causal factors, since they 
are in fact hazards themselves, will be referred to as software hazards. Any 
reference to software hazards must be taken in context, but generically they will 
always be causal factors. It is also assumed that medium- and high-level 
software hazards require analysis to the level of third-order causal factors, unless 
justified otherwise. 
E. VALIDATION OF SOFTWARE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
Validation of safety requirements is not achieved through metrics alone. 
Metrics, applied through this framework, will aid to validate software safety (and 
hence, system safety). However, an understanding of validation in the software 
safety context is required.  
Validation is largely dependent on the audience. Since we have defined 
the subject audience, determining the scope of validation is now possible. The 
primary audience is the safety engineering team; however, their focus on 
validation is two-fold. They wish to ensure that safety requirements are valid from 
their perspective, but also that validation is performed in accordance with high-
level stakeholder requirements and expectations. Expectation is derived from 
stakeholder requirements (through documents such as statement of needs, use 
cases, concept of operations, operation requirements documents, etc.) as a 
foundational starting point; however, stakeholder feedback clarifies our 
understanding of this foundation. Therefore, validation of safety requirements 
needs to provide actionable data to not only the safety engineering team, but 
also to stakeholders. The following paragraphs will break down the different 
elements of validation that this framework will address. 
From the safety engineering team’s point of view, requirements validation 
is key—that is, software safety requirements validation. According to Weaver 
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[15], “Requirements Validation—Demonstration that the set of Safety 
Requirements is complete [sufficient] and accurate.” 
Although safety requirements completeness is desirable, determining the 
completeness of the set of safety requirements is not realistic as pointed out by 
Gödel [16]. Therefore, where Weaver describes “complete” requirements, it will 
be considered as “sufficiency” of requirements. He further explains the concept 
as, “Requirements validity is demonstrated through the thoroughness of the 
approaches used for hazard identification.” [15] 
Using the above definitions, it can be derived that validation of software 
safety (for the safety engineering team) is primarily concerned with software 
safety requirements validation. Although Weaver’s statements above indicate 
that requirements validation simply requires that hazards identified are sufficient 
and accurate, software safety validation requires that: system hazards identified 
are sufficient, the software interaction with these hazards is known and accurate, 
and the subsequent derived software safety requirements are also sufficient and 
accurate. In reference to determining how sufficient and accurate these safety 
requirements are, Weaver [15] states, “It [requirements validation] necessitates 
demonstration that a suitable level of effort, expertise and knowledge has been 
applied to the failure mode identification.” 
Essentially, the above definition means that evidence for the validity of 
software safety requirements can be shown through the thoroughness of the 
safety process. For software safety requirements to be valid, hazard identification 
must be measured and hazard analysis must be measured. 
In his thesis, Weaver separates requirements validation from requirements 
traceability. However, traceability of software safety requirements is an important 
component of validation. Traceability is a pre-requisite of a valid requirement. 
Therefore, traceability from software safety requirements must also be 
measured. Traceability of software safety requirements is not as simple as 
traditional traceability of system requirements. Traceability of all safety 
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requirements subsequent to the initial derived safety requirements must be 
ensured, but traceability from derived safety requirements to system 
requirements must also be complete. In this case completeness means that there 
are no “orphan” safety requirements, i.e., there are no safety requirements that 
cannot be traced back to a hazard or, through a level of indirection, to another 
safety requirement. This is accomplished by tracing upward from derived safety 
requirements through the hazard analysis process to identified hazards, which 
are based on system requirements. Essentially, every software safety 
requirement must be traceable to an identified system level hazard (often through 
intermediary hazard causal factors). This process ensures traceability to the 
highest-level stakeholder requirements. One way this could be achieved is 
through dependency graphs in Configuration Management (CM) tools—
automating this process would provide a simple and efficient solution to 
traceability of safety requirements. Figure 5 shows how traceability of safety 




























Figure 5.   Traceability of Safety Requirements 
 
Weaver describes another aspect of arguing the safety of safety-critical 
software—Requirements Satisfaction. He states: 
Demonstrating Requirements Satisfaction is based upon showing 
that the behavior of the components of the system, i.e., hardware, 
software and other (e.g., human interaction) is acceptable with 
respect to the system level hazards. [15] 
Per Weaver’s definition, requirements satisfaction also contributes to the 
validation of safety requirements when considering “building the right safety 
product.” It also has an element of verification—ensuring that the requirements 
themselves are satisfied—but based on Weaver’s [15] description and 
subsequent analysis requirements satisfaction is primarily concerned with the 
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behavior of the system against the identified hazards (i.e., the right safety 
product). Weaver has effectively separated hazard identification and hazard 
analysis into requirements validation and requirements satisfaction, respectively. 
However, both hazard identification and hazard analysis have validation aspects. 
Valid software safety requirements are derived from valid system hazards, 
therefore the hazard analysis process and products require validation 
measurements.  
One tool for identifying system hazards is the misuse case. A misuse case 
is similar to a use case but it indicates possible misuse of the system, rather than 
normal, expected, operation by users. Another element of validity of identified 
hazards is their identification through misuse cases. All hazards identified 
through, or derived from, misuse cases must be documented as part of hazard 
identification. Conversely, any hazards identified other than through misuse 
cases should have a corresponding misuse case—this may require an iterative 
process whereby new misuse cases are created, furthering the safety 
engineering team’s understanding of system operation under hazardous 
conditions. 
Based on the above discussion, validation of software safety requirements 
through metrics, from the perspective of the safety engineering team and 
stakeholders, can be broken into three areas of concern: 
- Hazard Identification. 
- Hazard Analysis. 





Figure 6.   Elements of Validation of Software Safety Requirements  
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the traditional concept of validation (ensuring 
system specifications meet stakeholder requirements and expectations) is not 
suited for validation of safety requirements. Apart from generic (usually industry 
specific) safety requirements, stakeholders will often have one requirement 
concerning safety: the system must be safe. This requirement will often be an 
expectation, rather than conveyed through stakeholder documentation. The 
above paragraphs have identified the different areas of the safety process where 
validation plays a significant role. However, Figure 7 requires the addition of 
safety requirements for it to more clearly explain the validation connection. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Modified Elements of Validation of Software Safety Requirements 
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The ultimate goal of validation of software safety is to validate the safety 
requirements. However, because of the lack of stakeholder definition of what 
constitutes a safe system, an alternative validation model to the traditional model 
is proposed. Validation of safety requires a proxy through which to validate safety 
requirements. This proxy is the combination of software safety techniques used 
to derive the software safety requirements. Effectively, the software safety team 
acts as an advocate for safety on behalf of the stakeholders, determining system 
safety requirements based on the requirements of the system. Measurements to 
aid in the validation of safety-critical systems must be derived from the hazard 
identification, hazard analysis, and requirements traceability artifacts. Figure 8 
displays a simplified version of the traditional method of validation and the 
proposed model for validation of software safety requirements. 
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Figure 8.   Traditional Validation vs. Validation of Safety 
 
F. GOAL QUESTION METRIC APPROACH 
The Goal/Question/Metric (GQM) Approach [17] is a generic framework 
for defining and organizing software metrics according to organizational 
objectives. GQM was initially developed by Victor Basili and David Weiss [18] in 
1984 for NASA, and since then it has been used by a number of large software 
engineering corporations [19] (Philips, Siemens, and continued with NASA), 
resulting in a “de facto” standard for defining measurement frameworks. It 
employs a top-down definition by focusing on organizational goals and working 
down to applicable metrics that are used to realize these goals. Although 
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originally developed for defining and evaluating goals in a specific environment, 
the concept can be employed for nearly any environment where evaluating goals 
with empirical measurement is required. GQM uses a three-tiered approach for 
defining appropriate metrics: 
- The conceptual level (the Goal) defines measurement goals for 
product, process, or project. 
- The operational level (the Question) defines a set of questions to 
characterize the object of measurement with respect to a specific 
quality issue. 
- The quantitative level (the Metric) defines a collection of metrics 
selected to answer the questions in a quantitative way. 






QUESTION DQUESTION CQUESTION B
METRIC EMETRIC DMETRIC CMETRIC B
 
Figure 9.   GQM Hierarchy 
 
The resulting metrics are not restricted to any one question. As Figure 9 shows, 




The organizational aspect of the GQM approach is not restricted to 
“business” objectives, but rather it is a way of bounding the scope of the goals 
that can be identified. In the case of this thesis, the organization will be restricted 
to the safety engineering team.  
According to Basili et al. [17], “Measurement is a mechanism for creating a 
corporate memory and an aid in answering a variety of questions associated with 
the enactment of any software process.” 
Basili et al. [17] also state that, “Measurement, in order to be effective 
must be: 
- Focused on specific goals; 
- Applied to all lifecycle products, processes, and resources; 
- Interpreted based on characterization and understanding of the 
organizational context, environment, and goals.” 
Basili et al. stress the importance of a top-down methodology with a focus 
on goals and models. Hence the resulting GQM approach—allowing for goals to 
be realized through a top-down selection and organization of metrics based on 
goal-driven questions. 
Because of its malleable goal-focused approach, GQM is a perfect 
candidate for defining a validation metrics framework. As such, the GQM 
approach will be the cornerstone of the framework that will follow over the next 
few chapters. Validation is simply another aspect of lifecycle products, processes 
and resources, therefore lending itself to the application of the GQM approach to 
select, organize, and define applicable metrics. Goals will be tailored to the 
validation environment, as discussed in previous sections, with the focus on 
safety products.  
A GQM model is in itself extensible to other GQM models. Goals, 
questions and metrics from the model can all be utilized by other GQM models 
throughout the wider organization to satisfy measurement objectives. It is more 
likely that the metrics themselves will be shared amongst different GQM models. 
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However, if the goals and questions are applicable to other models, reuse of this 
information should be capitalized. Therefore, the creation of a validation GQM 
model should utilize metrics that are already collected (if they aid in answering 
the questions of the model). Conversely, other GQM models can reap the 
benefits of already established metrics, such as those under the validation GQM 
model. 
Basili et al. [20] define a set of templates and guidelines for the application 





The operational level (question) is divided into guidelines for product 
related questions and for process related questions, each addressing: 
- Definition (of product or process). 
- Quality perspectives of interest. 
- Feedback (relative to the quality perspective). 
Guidelines for the quantitative level (metric) are purely dependent on the 
quantification of the operational level. Basili et al. acknowledge the need for more 
than one metric to satisfy a question and that both objective (quantitative) and 
subjective (qualitative) metrics are valid. 
The GQM templates and guidelines will be used as a starting point for 
defining the framework based on the GQM approach. As identified by Basili et al. 
[20] regarding the templates and guidelines, “they will most likely change over 
time as our experience grows.” 
In this instance, the generalized templates and guidelines will be the initial 
foundation of the framework. However, specialization will occur to focus on 
validation of safety-critical software-intensive systems. 
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Lack of resources often plays havoc with development of software 
systems. Paucity of resources when applied to the metrics framework is also a 
possibility. It may be the case that a suitable framework is defined; however, 
realistically obtaining and analyzing the metrics data is beyond the reach of the 
safety engineering team due to lack of resources. Therefore, a prioritization 
scheme should be explored that covers all three levels of the framework (i.e., 
goals, questions, and metrics). Berander and Jönsson define an Extended GQM 
Approach [19] to address this issue. The approach utilizes surveys completed by 
stakeholders leading to the weighting of the goals and questions based on the 
responses. In the safety-critical environment, prioritization and weighting should 
also be determined based on such things as hazard levels and residual mishap 
risk levels. The Extended GQM Approach identified by Berander and Jönsson 
could be a realistic prioritization method for a validation metrics framework. 
G. SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE PROCESS 
Software Development Lifecycle Processes (SDLPs) come in many 
flavors and assortments. Understanding the basic characteristics of each major 
SDLP is necessary to define a validation metrics framework that is: 
a. Independent of the SDLP used, or 
b. Tailorable to the SDLP used. 
Although there are many other SDLPs used throughout the software 
engineering community, four major (and currently in use) methods are: 
1. Waterfall, 
2. V-Model, 
3. Spiral, and 
4. Iterative and Incremental Development (IID). 
These SDLPs can be classified as either sequential or evolutionary. The 
Waterfall, V-Model, and Spiral SDLPs are all sequential (typically), meaning that 
each phase in the lifecycle is performed upon completion of the previous phase. 
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Evolutionary SDLPs (IID) are not necessarily sequential in nature—concurrent 
engineering is a focus and repetition of the lifecycle is planned for. 
The Waterfall model is a sequential development strategy based on the 
major elements of any system development. It was originally proposed by 
Winston Royce [21] in 1970 as a method for developing large (or complex) 
software systems. Although Royce intended for his proposed model to be an 
iterative approach, this was largely ignored and instead the sequential “waterfall” 
model was adopted. Regardless of whether an iterative or sequential waterfall 
model is used, the following characteristics are typical: 
- Big Design Up Front (BDUF). The model requires a thorough 
understanding of requirements and large up front effort to ensure 
expectations are met. 
- Does not deal well with risk. Risk is not a focus of the process. 
Risky elements of the project may be afforded more resources, but 
there is no avenue for minimizing risk by breaking the large risk 
down into smaller more manageable risks. 
- Does not deal well with complexity. The process is typically 
monolithic in nature and complex systems become unwieldy and 
very difficult to understand under such a process. 
- Simplest and most efficient method for small projects. Resources 
are not wasted as the process includes only the “bare-essentials” to 
get the job done. 
- Validation is a product of user acceptance testing, falling under the 
Testing or Operations activities. 













Figure 10.   The Waterfall SDLP 
 
The V-Model is an extension, or modification, of the Waterfall SDLP. 
Instead of relying on a purely hierarchical sequential structure, it realizes that 
verification occurs (or should occur) at more intervals than just during the Testing 
phase. It is still a sequential method—development occurs on the way down the 
left side of the V, and verification occurs against each element on the right side of 
the V. Testing is still performed sequentially from the bottom up, and validation 
effectively occurs as verification tests are carried out. The V-Model has the 
following characteristics: 
- Incorporates all the characteristics as the Waterfall model. 
- Verification occurs at multiple levels. Verification is the focus of this 
model. It ensures that each level of development, from 
requirements analysis through to implemented code, is verified 
against applicable requirements. 
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- Validation is obtained through verification activities. Although not 
designed to occur this way, any verification activities will have some 
influence on validation by revelation of the system capabilities to 
stakeholders through testing. This validation technique builds upon 
the Waterfall model by breaking testing into identified elements and 
testing from the lowest level to the highest requirements. 
















Figure 11.   The V-Model SDLP 
 
The Spiral Model was introduced by Boehm in 1988 to address many of 
the shortfalls experienced with the typical Waterfall SDLP. Boehm [22] proposed 
a risk-driven approach to software development, consisting of a series of spirals 
with clear objectives, alternate means of implementation, and constraints 
imposed. Essentially the model is the Waterfall model with a focus on risk 
analysis. Each spiral ends with a prototype product, dependent on the 
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progression through the development process, which is then verified through 
simulations, models, or benchmarks. The Spiral Model does enhance the 
Waterfall Model to a large degree; however, it also carries over many of the 
same characteristics. The following are the characteristics of the Spiral Model: 
- The BDUF concept is broken down. Because the Spiral Model has 
a focus on progressive spirals of requirements definition and 
analysis, the BDUF concept is broken into more manageable 
chunks. Although this is an advantage, detailed specification is still 
a prerequisite to implementation. 
- Design alternatives through reuse or reworks are incorporated. This 
allows for analysis of possible reuse candidates, or if mistakes are 
made (usually in understanding users expectations—validation) 
rework can be performed. 
- Risk analysis as a mandated step results in careful planning. 
- Validation is a more realistic concept through the development of 
prototypes (whether they be requirements specification, detailed 
requirements, module design, etc.). This allows for language 
translation to occur through regular reviews and testing at the end 
of each spiral; however, it does not specifically address validation. 
The Spiral Model is shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.   The Spiral SDLP [From [22]] 
 
The Iterative and Incremental Development (IID) model is the most recent 
SDLP of the four. IID is an evolutionary and progressive method. According to 
Larman [23]: 
The iterative lifecycle is based on the successive enlargement of a 
system through multiple iterations, with cyclic feedback and 
adaption as core drivers to converge upon a suitable system. The 
system grows incrementally over time, iteration by iteration. 
IID aims to address the issue of complexity. As systems become 
increasingly complex, sequential development methods (all previously mentioned 
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SDLPs) become exceedingly difficult to implement. IID allows for the 
development effort to be broken into more manageable portions of logic and 
customer feedback is welcomed throughout the process. The following are 
characteristics of the IID SDLP: 
- The BDUF concept is non-existent. Fully defining all system 
capabilities is often challenging or near impossible for many large 
systems. IID embraces this problem, and therefore does not 
mandate complete specification prior to development. 
- Risks are identified, or become self evident, incrementally. Rather 
than discovering integration issues late in development, or safety 
hazards upon deployment, risks are identified as a more thorough 
understanding of the system is gained through each increment of 
design and development. 
- Validation is a core focus of IID. Although typically not explicitly 
identified as validation, user/customer feedback as the system is 
incrementally delivered allows for expectations to be more closely 
met. 
- Requirements instability is a reality. Requirements are often not 
stable until the final iteration of development. This in itself can 
become subjective, e.g., when is the final iteration if requirements 
are not stable? 
- “Scope-creep” is a very real threat. IID requires sufficient bounding 
over its complete lifecycle to prevent excessive requirements 
change (this characteristic closely ties with the previous). 
- Difficult to contractually manage. Due to the fact that IID does not 
mandate complete specification prior to design and development 
(rather it encourages exploration of system requirements and 
understanding), it can often be difficult to implement for large, 
complex systems under contract. 
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Figure 13 shows the IID SDLP. Each vertical line represents an 
incremental build of software (although the headings detail Inception, 
Elaboration, Construction, and Transition, each of these activities are undertaken 
for each iteration). They are, however, iteratively revisited through Business 
Modeling, Requirements, Analysis and Design, Implementation, Test, and 
Deployment throughout the entire SDLP.  
 
Figure 13.   The Iterative and Incremental Development (IID) SDLP 
 
The above SDLPs are typical of those currently used in the software 
engineering discipline. Their characteristics differ significantly, and therefore 
consideration of these characteristics is required for developing a validation 
metrics framework. As the framework is developed throughout the following 
chapter, these SDLPs will influence the possible solution(s). To cater to each 
SDLP, the framework will either be tailorable to the specific SDLP or be 
independent of the SDLP. 
When considering the above SDLPs from the safety engineering team’s 
perspective, there are also large impacts on the way safety is achieved. Much of 
the software safety process (as defined by Leveson [14]) relies on definition and 
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design of the subject system to relate hazardous conditions to software, hence 
defining what is safety-critical software and what is not. Therefore, depending on 
the SDLP used, the framework will behave differently due to the fact that 
development is carried out differently. For the SDLPs that focus on the BDUF 
principle, complete design data will be available sooner (theoretically) than an 
evolutionary SDLP. In the case of the IID SDLP, requirements and design 
artifacts will be incrementally produced. Thus, identification of new safety-critical 
software, and most likely new hazards, will occur throughout the process. This 
will also occur on many BDUF SDLPs, though not to the same order of 
magnitude that would be expected of an evolutionary type of development. This 
is another aspect that the Validation Metrics Framework needs to account for 
when considering the type of SDLP used. 
H. FRAMEWORK OBJECTIVES 
Safety-critical software-intensive systems are subjected to the highest 
levels of scrutiny and quality assurance in software engineering. A holistic, 
systematic approach to the validation of these systems is required. Currently 
none exist. Validation metrics can be used to ensure user and stakeholder 
requirements and expectations are closely matched. However, due to the 
possibly vast number of domains that users and stakeholders can represent, 
there is no “silver bullet” that will be applicable at all levels within all domains. 
Therefore, the intent of this thesis is to establish a framework for validation 
metrics applicable to safety engineering teams. The safety engineering team is 
typically responsible for constructing a safety argument supported by a collection 
of evidence on the application of safety engineering for a system’s development. 
Validation metrics data will aid in forming this argument as it is presented to 
stakeholders concerned with determining the validity of system safety 
requirements—addressing the key elements of Hazard Identification, Hazard 
Analysis and Safety Requirements Traceability. 
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The framework must cater for the unique aspects of software safety. 
Reliability is not a key indicator of safety and therefore will not be the focus of 
software safety. The software safety process, as described by Leveson [14], is to 
be central to the development of the Validation Metrics Framework. Therefore, 
measurement data will arise from products associated with the software safety 
process. 
The Validation Metrics Framework must be able to identify existing metrics 
(should there be any that are suitable) that may be used in the validation context 
(or at least define their characteristics) and define the characteristics of those 
metrics that do not exist (to aid in their development). The key focus of the 
framework will be that of providing the users of the framework with actionable 
data (from metrics) based on the requirements and expectations of stakeholders 
with a focus on system safety. The safety engineering team will develop their 
own understanding of system safety based on high-level user documents from 
the users and stakeholders (which can consist of any user or stakeholder 
document describing how they expect to use the system), system specification, 
and subsequent documentation by the development team. 
Traceability of requirements is one of the key concerns of modern systems 
engineering, as has top-down approaches to system design becoming a common 
practice in all engineering disciplines. The framework for validation metrics 
should be congruent with requirements traceability and top-down design. A goal-
driven approach will ensure that every metric has a purpose, reducing wasted 
collection of data, and ensuring that the rationale behind measurements is 
justifiable. Traceability from goals to metrics and metrics to goals will be a key 
objective of the framework. For this thesis, the GQM approach will be the 
cornerstone of the framework, allowing for development of metrics in a controlled 
and purposeful approach for validating the safety of a system. 
The validation activity is not restricted to simply the safety engineering 
team. Although the focus of this thesis is safety, the framework must be 
sufficiently open to other aspects of validation and metrics gathering on a 
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system. Therefore, prioritization of validation metrics within the framework should 
be possible, and also prioritization through external influences. Metrics may be 
gathered by many different stakeholders of the system. Thus, the Validation 
Metrics Framework should be able to become part of a hierarchically prioritized 
overarching framework (i.e., the sum of the system concerns), influencing overall 
prioritization of measurements. 
The framework must cater for major SDLPs (identified through the four 
described previously, however characterized as sequential or evolutionary) 
characteristics either through tailoring to suit each specific instance, or by 
independence from the SDLPs. 
In summary, the Validation Metrics Framework objectives are: 
- Scope is restricted to validation metrics applicable to the safety 
engineering team in the sense that they will be the users of the 
framework. The resulting data aiding in validation of safety will be 
presented to users and stakeholders through safety 
arguments/cases. 
- Cater for the unique aspects of the software safety process (based 
on products and artifacts). 
- Identify existing metrics (or at least characteristics required) and 
define characteristics of non-existent metrics (to aid in their 
development). 
- Utilize a top-down goal-driven approach (GQM) to ensure 
relevance of data, identify the applicable environment/audience, 
and provide traceability. 
- Explore the possibility of allowing for prioritization of measurements 
based on safety aspects (e.g., hazard levels and residual mishap 
risk) and be amenable to prioritization influence from overarching 
metrics frameworks. 
- Cater for a range of SDLPs (focusing on the four described 
previously) by either tailorability or independence from the SDLPs. 
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These objectives will flow through as inputs to the development of the 
Validation Metrics Framework in the following chapter. 
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAMEWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The framework objectives detailed in Chapter III serve as the primary 
focus for the development of a validation metrics framework. This chapter will 
further analyze specific attributes of the framework to describe how it will be 
composed, as well as the process for application. The following chapter will 
demonstrate application of the framework through a case study. 
B. FRAMEWORK GOAL STRUCTURE 
The GQM approach as defined by Basili et al. [17] proposes a single level 
of goals in the GQM hierarchy. However, to aid in defining clear goals for the 
Validation Metrics Framework, it is prudent to determine an overarching 
framework goal (in the format that Basili and Rombach [20] provide) prior to 
these lower-level goals. By developing a hierarchy of goals from the highest 
level, sufficient depth will result so that the formulation of subsequent questions 
will be an achievable task. This concept will also ensure that a truly top-down 
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Figure 14.   Validation Metrics Framework Goal Hierarchy 
 
The Framework Goal is the highest level goal defined. For the purposes of 
this thesis, it restricts application as per the objectives of Chapter III. That is, it 
focuses on the safety engineering team as the user of the framework within a 
validation environment. The dashed lines between the Framework Goal and 
goals A and B indicate that there may be intermediate levels of goal definition as 
goals are broken up in a top-down fashion to a suitable level for formulating 
applicable questions. Influencing these intermediate goals (or even the resultant 
low-level goals if no intermediate goals exist) are framework inputs. These inputs 
consist of many of the objectives mentioned in Chapter III. The following section 
will provide detail on framework inputs. 
Using Basili and Rombach’s [20] templates for goal definition, the 
Framework Goal definition is: 
- Purpose: To measure the products of the software safety process 
throughout development and implementation in order to aid in 
validating software safety requirements. 
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- Perspective: Examine the metrics from the safety engineering 
team’s point of view, with a focus on validating software safety 
requirements by proxy—in accordance with the proposed model for 
validation of software safety requirements. 
- Environment: The system has safety-critical elements that will be 
bound by the software safety process. 
This Framework Goal will carry over to any application of the Validation 
Metrics Framework within the scope of this thesis, i.e., use by the safety 
engineering team for safety-critical software-intensive systems, as goals are 
identified in a top-down fashion, ensuring context is maintained. Given another 
area of application, the Framework Goal could be changed to suit. 
Determining subsequent levels of goals is dependent on the framework 
inputs as discussed below. Following identification of these inputs, guidance will 
be given on the formulation of the remaining goals and questions. 
C. FRAMEWORK INPUTS 
The inputs to the framework are of significant importance. These inputs 
will influence how the lower-level goals are defined. Inputs to the framework will 
be identified by their influence on the framework goals; that is, for an element to 
be considered an input, it must have some relevance to the goals. As stated 
earlier, goals are defined in terms of purpose, perspective, and environment. 
These three aspects will be the focus of any input to the framework. 
1. SDLP Input 
The SDLP chosen will have a significant affect on the types of goals that 
can be formulated, particularly when considering the environment aspect of the 
goal. Following the Framework Goal, the SDLP needs to be noted as an 
environment factor for the subsequent goals to clarify what is realistic, or even 
possible. For example, a goal of maintaining safety requirements stability to 
within 5% (i.e., change of number of safety requirements over the lifecycle, or 
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similar) while using an evolutionary SDLP is not a realistic goal since 
requirements in an evolutionary SDLP are inherently unstable.  
Another factor that needs to be considered is when safety products (the 
results of the system software safety process) will be available for measurement 
and how the chosen SDLP affects these measurements. The system software 
safety process described by Leveson [14] is portrayed in a “Waterfall” fashion 
(however, it does not imply that the process must be carried out sequentially). 
Therefore, when employed in an SDLP other than sequential, care must be taken 
to realize that the process itself will be iterative in nature. Safety requirements will 
change as the system matures either iteratively, incrementally, or both. New 
safety-critical software components will be identified as the design matures in 
each pass through the evolutionary process. Even in the V-model SDLP, 
verification of safety requirements will occur at different stages. 
The SDLP framework input will influence the environment factor of goals 
identified. This will shape subsequent goals, questions, and metrics to ensure 
that data being gathered is tailored to the SDLP chosen, and that data presented 
to the framework user is applicable to their situation. The following SDLP 
characteristics need to be considered as environmental factors when developing 
intermediary goals: 
- SDLP method. Is it evolutionary or sequential? This will be the 
major characteristic that will influence many of the following 
characteristics. 
- Safety stability. Will the system software safety process products 
be continuously changing because of the type of SDLP? This will 
be a key influencing factor on metrics gathered. 
- Current validation methods. How is validation of the system 
currently carried out in the chosen SDLP? An SDLP that supports 
operator and customer feedback throughout will provide for more 
opportunity to clarify validation of safety through metrics. One that  
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does not support this interaction will need to consider the 
appropriate goals for ensuring that there is sufficient feedback from 
the user community. 
- Safety process execution. How is the safety process carried out in 
the chosen SDLP? Will all safety products be available up front, or 
will they become available as the system matures? Hazards, for 
example, identified early on in the project may become redundant 
as the system matures, or there may be new ones identified. The 
goals of the framework need to be amenable to these changes. 
Generally, the SDLP chosen will not directly determine the goals identified 
for the generic Validation Metric Framework. It will be an influencing factor on the 
environment component of the goals; however, this is simply a contextual impact. 
Interpretation of any actionable metric data will need to be undertaken in the 
context of the SDLP. 
2. Safety Input 
The software safety process used will influence framework goals. This 
process will be the driving factor behind what products will be available for 
measurement throughout development. 
Safety products that are available for measurement will vary depending on 
the exact software safety process used. A safety product reference list should be 
compiled to ensure that all safety products are known and can be planned for 
inclusion as input to the framework. This list will need to be identified for each 
application of the framework and will serve as a reference list for the specific 
goals, questions and metrics. It will serve as a “sanity” check for what is 
obviously possible and not possible, according to the types of products available, 
but also serve the same purpose for those goals that may not be so obviously 




product available to obtain a metric from, the goal either needs to be revised or 
revoked. The safety product reference list is a simple method for identifying 
appropriate product metrics. 
Some typical system software safety products are: 
- Preliminary Hazard List (PHL), 
- Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), 
- Hazard analysis reports: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Modes 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA), Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), etc., 
- Independent Safety Audit Reports, 
- Safety Requirements Specification, 
- System Safety Requirements Traceability Matrix (SSRTM), and 
- System Software Safety Requirements Traceability Matrix 
(SSSRTM). 
An exhaustive list is not provided, as each project will define their own 
version of the system safety process, therefore tailoring the products that will 
result. The above list serves as an example of possible products that may 
comprise the safety product reference list.  
3. Stakeholder Feedback 
To ensure a truly effective and efficient Validation Metrics Framework, the 
framework needs to allow for inputs of stakeholder feedback. Primarily this will be 
through clarification of high-level user requirements, but could also be as a direct 
result of the metrics being presented. Initially the metrics would be available to 
the safety engineering team, but this same information would also be presented 
to necessary stakeholders, particularly the operators and owners. The results of 
the metrics may influence composition of goals, or directly the goals themselves. 
It may also have an impact on prioritization. Therefore, any stakeholder feedback 
needs to be combined as part of the framework inputs. 
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The identified framework inputs are shown graphically in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.   Framework Inputs 
 
D. IDENTIFYING GOALS, QUESTIONS AND METRICS 
Following on from the Framework Goal definition, intermediary goals must 
be identified to a sufficient level as to enable the creation of questions. Because 
of the hierarchical nature of the framework, intermediary goals will be influenced 
by the Framework Goal and framework inputs.  
Goals may or may not continue to be described through purpose, 
perspective, and environment as proposed by Basili and Rombach. This will 
depend on the clarity of the goals in a few words, dependent on the personnel 
involved. Although the Framework Goal is given in this format, the following 
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derived goals (for this thesis) will simply be presented in a few words. Further 
clarification can be given if required. The use of a hierarchical top-down goal 
derivation structure will aid in reducing complexity of defining goals, and ensure 
that the scope and focus for metric identification is maintained.  
Each intermediary goal must measure products from all stages of the 
system software safety process including: 
- Conceptual development. 
- System design. 
- Full-scale development. 
- System production and deployment. 
- System operation. 
The framework results, or measurements, will change, develop, and 
mature as the system itself matures. Depending on the SDLP used, these will 
either be slight changes or continual development. Although a generic framework 
will initially be given, it is expected that goals may be added, removed, or 
improved; framework inputs will be added, removed, or improved; or stakeholder 
feedback will influence the goal structure. 
To aid in the goal derivation process, the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
method proposed by Weaver et al. [24] will be used. Weaver et al. [24] state that, 
“The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)… is a graphical notation for constructing 
complex safety arguments for safety cases.” 
Although specifically designed for constructing safety arguments, the 
method also lends itself to rational development of hierarchical goal structures 
while ensuring that context, justification, assumptions, strategies, and solutions 
are all included. 
Briefly, the GSN method consists of elements shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16.   Principle Elements of GSN [From [24]] 
 
Using these elements, the goal hierarchy of the Validation Metric 
Framework can be composed in a rational and justified manner, whilst still 
maintaining a top-down approach within the appropriate context. An example of 
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Figure 17.    GSN Example 
 
In the above example, GSN is combined with the GQM framework 
creating a hybrid solution. GSN is used to develop and convey the goal structure, 
taking into account any necessary purpose, perspective, and environment 
attributes that benefit from being displayed. These are indicated through the goal 
itself and the context notation. As with the originally proposed Validation Metrics 
Framework depicted in Figure 14, goals can be decomposed into subsequent 
lower-level goals to allow for easier derivation and more precise definition of the 
following question. Not shown in the GSN notation proposed by Weaver et al. is 
the inclusion of questions. Since the Validation Metrics Framework specifically 
treats metrics, applying the GQM process allows questions to be derived from  
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the goals. Questions are indicated by hexagons in Figure 17. In the GSN 
diagram solutions are shown by circles. In the case of the Validation Metrics 
Framework, the solutions are in fact metrics.  
In the above example, the following text notation is used: 
- FG: Framework Goal 
- C1, C2, Cn: Context 
- S1: Strategy 
- G1, G2, Gn: Goals 
- Q1, Q2, Qn: Questions 
- J1: Justification 
- M1, M2, Mn: Metric. 
In many cases the visual representation will not be sufficient to clearly 
articulate all aspects of the goals, context, justification, strategy, or questions. 
Therefore, accompanying the visual GSN/GQM-based representation of the 
framework should be documentation expanding on these aspects. Specifically, 
where a goal is identified, in keeping with the purpose, perspective, and 
environment attributes, only those attributes that are required to ensure that 
context is clearly understood in the visual representation will be shown. 
Otherwise, the attributes (should they be required for clarity) will be noted in the 
documentation such that it is accessible for reference. The primary reason for 
this is to reduce clutter and maintain simplicity in the GSN diagram. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the three elements of validation of 
software safety will be: Hazard Identification, Hazard Analysis, and Software 
Safety Requirements Traceability. Therefore, these elements need to be 
incorporated into the goals of the framework. Utilizing GSN, the most applicable 
place for these elements will be to reflect them in strategies and/or goals. 
Based on the three elements of validation of software safety, the GQM 
framework, and GSN—Figure 18 shows the top level goal structure for the 
Validation Metrics Framework. 
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Figure 18.   Framework Top-Level Goal Structure 
 
The top-level goals will flow into either intermediary goals or questions as 
the framework continues to be developed. Each goal has a red arrow with a 
corresponding identifier that will be used in the following GSN structures. Each of 
the identified goals have been identified as generic to any safety-critical software-
intensive system, but are specifically based on the understanding of validation of 
software safety developed thus far. The following paragraphs will provide more 
explanation on each goal. 
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G1: Number of software hazards identified is sufficient. This goal 
directly addresses the Hazard Identification element of validation of software 
safety requirements. The aim of this goal is to ensure that a sufficient number of 
software hazards are identified for a particular system. If the number of identified 
hazards is outside of a pre-determined upper or lower boundary, it can indicate 
that the Hazard Identification is not sufficient, therefore resulting in potential for 
invalid or incomplete software safety requirements. 
G2: Depth of analysis is measured. This goal partially addresses the 
Hazard Analysis element of validation of software safety. Depth of analysis is 
associated with the inherent risk associated with identified software hazards. By 
ensuring that the hazard analysis is performed to a sufficient level of depth 
(second- and third-order causal factors) for appropriate software hazards, the 
validity of the analysis is strengthened. 
G3: Software safety requirements are measured. This goal also 
partially addresses the Hazard Analysis element of validation of software safety. 
The result of hazard analysis is that requirements are identified to sufficiently 
mitigate the software hazards. By measuring the number of software safety 
requirements against a pre-determined model, the sufficiency of hazard analysis 
(and therefore validity of subsequent requirements), can be obtained. 
G4: Software hazards are sufficiently mitigated. This goal also partially 
addresses the Hazard Analysis element of validation of software safety. 
Measurements that show hazards have associated mitigating safety 
requirements will aid to strengthen the validation case. 
G5: Traceability of software safety requirements is maintained. This 
goal directly addresses the Software Safety Requirements Traceability element 
of validation of software safety. Ensuring that all safety requirements can be 
traced through hazard analysis to hazards, which are then traceable to system 
requirements, aids in ensuring valid software safety requirements. 
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Following on from the top-level goal structure, questions and metrics are 
then identified to fulfill each goal. The following GSN structures show the lower 
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Figure 20.   Framework Lower-Half Part 2 
 
The derivation of the lower-half of the Validation Metrics Framework 
shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20 result in a generic set of validation metrics for 
use on any safety-critical software-intensive system. Some of the above metrics 
are self explanatory while others are not. The following paragraphs detail each of 
the validation metrics. 
M16: Percent Software Hazards. M1 (PSH) is a direct indicator of the 
sufficiency of Hazard Identification. By comparing the number of software 
hazards identified against historical data, it indicates the validity of the software 
safety requirements through identified hazards. Interpretation of M1 requires a 
model to determine whether a sufficient number of hazards have been identified. 
 
                                            
6 M1 is an adaptation of M3–Percent Software Safety Requirements, developed by Victor 
Basili et al. at [36]. 
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PSH = (#Software Hazards / #System Hazards) * 100 
Equation 1.   Percent Software Hazards 
The model for M1 requires an Estimated PSH (EPSH) based on 
previously developed similar systems (e.g., similar levels of software control, 
safety-criticality, and risk levels). 
If |PSH – EPSH| < σ, then a sufficient number of software hazards have 
been identified in hazard identification, where EPSH is the average of the PSHs 
for all other similar systems, and σ is the standard deviation of the PSHs. 
M2: Software Hazard Analysis Depth. Hazardous software, or safety-
critical software, allocated as high- or medium-risk, according to the SHCM, 
requires analysis of second- and third-order causal factors (should they exist). 
The depth of hazard analysis, indicated by this metric, will contribute to the 
sufficiency of overall software hazard analysis and hence validity of derived 
requirements. M2 will be an indicator of whether hazards have been analyzed to 
a sufficient depth. 
To determine the depth of hazard analysis a Hazard Analysis Space 
(HAS) must be identified. Complete coverage of the HAS indicates complete 
hazard causal factor analysis (down to third-order causal factors). Table 1 
depicts an example of HAS. 
 
H1 Hn Med1 Medn Mod1 Modn L1 Ln 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2     
3 3 3 3     
Table 1.   Hazard Analysis Space 
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In Table 1 Hn, Medn, Modn, and Ln indicate n number of hazards within the 
same risk category. The numbers reflect levels of analysis. For example, a 3 
indicates third-order analysis. As indicated, moderate- and low-level risk hazards 
do not typically require analysis beyond first-order causal factors. For moderate-
risk hazards, other metrics identified in the framework indicate first-order analysis 
as a matter of course. Low-risk hazards are those which are perceived to be of 
acceptable nature. Therefore, this metric will only consider high- and medium-risk 
hazards. When developing the metric it is important to ensure that high- and 
medium-risk hazards (according to the SHCM) are initially reported separately to 
allow for subsequent investigation activities. 
Calculating the total HAS for each category of hazards (high or medium) is 
shown in the following formulas. 
HASH = # High-Risk Software Hazards * 3 
Equation 2.   Hazard Analysis Space—High-Risk 
HASM = # Medium Risk Software Hazards * 3 
Equation 3.   Hazard Analysis Space—Medium Risk 
In each equation, the constant 3 reflects the three possible levels of causal factor 
analysis. 
Determining the coverage of hazard analysis (in terms of coverage of the 
HAS) for each category requires a Hazard Analysis Achieved (HAA) figure 
expressed as a percentage of total HAS.  Equations for high- and medium-risk 
are given below. 
CH = [(∑HAAn) / HASH] * 100% 
Equation 4.   Hazard Analysis Space Coverage—High-Risk 
CM = [(∑HAAn) / HASMED] * 100% 
Equation 5.   Hazard Analysis Space Coverage – Medium Risk 
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In both equations above, C is the coverage of the HAS, and HAAn is the hazard 
analysis achieved for each risk applicable to their specific categories. HAAn is 
determined for each hazard by adding one for each level of analysis. For 
example, second-order analysis corresponds to a HAA of 2 for a single risk. 
The coverage metric identified above provides an indication of depth of 
hazard analysis for each category of hazards. However, a single overall metric 
should be provided as an initial indicator of validity of safety requirements. 
Software Hazard Analysis Depth (SHAD) is determined by averaging the 
coverage metrics, CH and CM. 
SHAD = (CH + CM)/2 
Equation 6.   Software Hazard Analysis Depth 
As with other metrics used in this framework, growth or reduction can be 
best presented through a graph shown over time. However, care must be taken 
in interpreting the results of this metric. Contrary to other identified metrics, 
SHAD is not expected to reach 100%. This is because it is highly unlikely that 
every high- or medium-level risk hazard will have up to third-order causal factors. 
Hazard analysis may reveal only second-order causal factors in many cases. 
Another factor that will contribute to reduction of coverage is when new high- or 
medium-risk hazards are initially identified without immediate hazard causal 
factor analysis. This will lower the SHAD in the first instance. 
Therefore, SHAD is only intended to be an indicator (as are all other 
metrics) to sufficiency of software hazard analysis, and hence an indicator of 
validity of software safety requirements. Once a baseline is established in the 
early stages of development, preferably at a point where hazards are well 
understood, changes in SHAD will require investigation to determine if the depth 
of analysis is sufficient, is expected to become sufficient, or is not sufficient. 
SHAD in itself cannot directly determine sufficiency; rather, it is an indicator of 
sufficiency. 
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M3: Percent Software Safety Requirements [36]. M3 (PSSR7) is an 
indicator of how sufficient hazard analysis has been performed, and hence the 
validity of the derived safety requirements. It is similar in format to M1. 
Interpreting PSSR requires a model that indicates sufficiency, providing upper 
and lower boundaries. The model for PSSR relies on the previous results of 
similar systems to determine what is sufficient. 
PSSR = (#Software Safety Requirements / #Software Requirements) * 100 
Equation 7.   Percent Software Safety Requirements 
The model for PSSR requires an Estimated PSSR (EPSSR) based on 
previously developed similar systems. If |PSSR – EPSSR| < σ, then a sufficient 
number of software safety requirements have resulted from the hazard analysis, 
where EPSSR is the average of the PSSRs for all other similar systems, and σ is 
the standard deviation of the PSSRs. 
Another possibility for the model is by using a proxy: EPSSR = (#system 
safety requirements / #system requirements)*100, and σ = X% of EPSSR. X% 
will require engineering judgment to determine an acceptable deviation from the 
mean. Success of previous systems, particularly where there has not been a 
sufficient sample size to determine a standard deviation, should also be taken 
into account to give an EPSSR. Basili et al. [25] recommend a deviation of 20% 
EPSSR. 
M4: Percent high-risk software hazards with safety requirements. M4 
reveals whether any high-risk software hazards have not resulted in applicable 
safety requirements through hazard analysis. This indicates sufficiency of the 
process (through artifacts), and hence validity of the requirements. 
M4 = (# SHHR-SR / # SHHR) * 100 
Equation 8.   Metric 4 
                                            
7 Original PSSR metric uses e = σ. For clarity, only σ is used to indicate deviation. 
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In Equation 8, # SHHR-SR is the number of high-risk software hazards with 
associated safety requirements, and # SHHR is the total number of high-risk 
software hazards. 
As development of the system progresses, it is expected that this metric 
will approach, and reach, 100%. This metric will benefit from being graphed over 
time. 
M5: Percent medium risk software hazards with safety requirements. 
M5 is simply an extension to M4 by considering medium risk software hazards. 
M5 = (# SHMR-SR / # SHMR) * 100 
Equation 9.   Metric 5 
In Equation 9, # SHMR-SR is the number of medium risk software hazards with 
associated safety requirements, and # SHMR is the total number of medium risk 
software hazards. 
M6: Percent moderate risk software hazards with safety 
requirements. M6 again is an extension to M4 by considering moderate risk 
software hazards. 
M6 = (# SHMoR-SR / # SHMoR) * 100 
Equation 10.   Metric 6 
In Equation 10, # SHMoR-SR is the number of moderate risk software hazards with 
associated safety requirements, and # SHMoR is the total number of moderate risk 
software hazards. 
M7: Percent software safety requirements traceable to hazards. 
Ensuring traceability to system hazards increases the validation case. M7 is 
simply a percentage indicator of traceability of requirements. All derived software 
safety requirements must be traceable to system hazards. 
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M7 = (# SSRTR / # SSR) * 100 
Equation 11.   Metric 7 
In Equation 11, # SSRTR is the number of traceable software safety 
requirements, and # SSR is the total number of software safety requirements. 
This metric should approach, and reach, 100% over time, and will benefit from 
being graphed. 
In total, seven metrics have been identified in the development of the 
Validation Metrics Framework. Discussed throughout this chapter is the notion of 
metrics only being an indicator of validity of software safety requirements. This is 
further discussed in a more concrete example in the following chapter. The key to 
the Validation Metrics Framework is that the metrics will only act as indicators for 
further investigation. The investigation itself will determine the actual validity of 
the software safety requirements, with metrics acting as initiators. 
In the following chapter, application of the framework is explored through a 
case study, with the aim of clarifying the framework and the metrics. 
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V. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK THROUGH CASE 
STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The proposed Validation Metrics Framework developed in Chapter IV is at 
this stage a theoretical academic exercise. Although it employs some relatively 
proven and successful methods as its foundation, further analysis is necessary to 
demonstrate its validity and the benefits to be accrued from its application. This 
chapter presents a case study of a fictitious surface-to-air missile system as a 
safety-critical software-intensive system. The system will be based on 
unrestricted information available in open literature representative of typical 
surface-to-air missile systems. The case study will work through parts of the 
system development lifecycle; however, it will not be a complete case study 
addressing every aspect. Instead it will simply provide a brief look at how the 
Validation Metrics Framework can be applied throughout the software 
development process and some of the associated benefits. 
B. RASAM8 
The Rapid Action Surface-to-Air Missile (RASAM) system—a Shipboard 
Self-Defense Missile System—will be the subject of this case study. The 
following system description and operational requirements are not intended to be 
as complete as a “real” system would be. The RASAM will only be defined and 
analyzed to a sufficient level to allow the Validation Metrics Framework to be 
exercised. In many cases only representative examples will be called upon, 
rather than a complete analysis or design. 
The RASAM will be followed through a rudimentary tailored waterfall 
software development lifecycle process. Since this is only a fictional system, we 
                                            
8 The RASAM example is taken from the Naval Postgraduate School’s course on Weapon 
System Software Safety. 
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are able to employ such a design approach, particularly as we are not fully 
defining or developing the system. In the sense that requirements for the system 
shall be known and complete throughout the development process (i.e., there will 
be no iterative development), the RASAM development will be of waterfall 
fashion. 
Accompanying the development lifecycle will be the system and software 
safety process as presented by Leveson [14]. It will be the products of this 
process that will be candidate for measurement by the Validation Metrics 
Framework. 
The aim of this case study is not an in-depth analysis of system design or 
lifecycle process. Rather, it is simply to show how the framework is applied to a 
system and how results can be interpreted. Therefore, the complete lifecycle will 
not be explored. 
C. SYSTEM CONTEXT AND ARTIFACTS 
The RASAM is initially presented through operational requirements (high-
level customer/stakeholder requirements), a series of use cases, misuse cases, 
and accompanying safety artifacts. The artifacts shown are representative of 
actual artifacts. They are not intended to be complete or entirely accurate. 
Metrics used throughout the case study may not correlate with artifacts shown 
Appendix A. The primary goal of the artifacts is simply to provide context for the 
system and to represent what should be expected of a real safety-critical system. 
1. Operational Requirements 
The RASAM system is a Shipboard Self-Defense Missile System. The 
basic high-level operational requirements for the system are given below. These 
requirements are equivalent to high-level customer/stakeholder requirements, 
describing their expectations and desires of the system. Although these 
requirements will not be utilized in the framework itself, they are given to aid in 
providing context of the safety-critical software-intensive system to the reader. 
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The Validation Metrics Framework will only provide indications to validity, 
identifying critical areas that may require further investigation to ascertain validity 
of the requirements. 
OR.1. RASAM shall be installed on surface combatants, aircraft carriers, 
and amphibious ships, 8K tons and up. 
OR.2. RASAM shall have an effective range of 15km. 
OR.3. RASAM shall be an anti-ship missile and anti-aircraft weapon for 
current and postulated threats. 
OR.4. RASAM shall achieve a Pk (probability of kill) not less than .975 for 
dual salvo. 
OR.5. RASAM shall achieve a Pa (availability) not less than .98 
OR.6. The Launching System shall: 
o Be capable of a minimum of ten 2-missile salvos without 
reloading, 
o Have a shipboard reload capability,  
o Be fully reloaded in less than thirty seconds by no more than 
three trained weapons technicians, and 
o Minimize ship alterations required for installation. 
OR.7. The Control System shall: 
o Interface to existing and future C&C systems and shipboard 
sensors, 
o Provide a stand-alone operation capability, and 
o Provide an organic training capability. 
OR.8. The launcher subsystem shall have a No-Point/No-Fire design 
toward the ship’s superstructure, equipment, or other places where a 
missile could impact. It must accommodate moveable equipment: 
o The RASAM shall have automatic detection of equipment 
movement. 
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It must also accommodate ancillary equipment such as aircraft and 
helicopters: 
o The RASAM shall preclude firing in the direction when deck 
areas are occupied. 
2. System Use Cases 
The system use cases further describe how the customer/stakeholders 
intend to interact with the RASAM and the expected operations and results. Each 
use case is described from the users’ perspective at the early stages of 
development, and is therefore not “fully-dressed.” These use cases will provide 
sufficient depth for the purpose of this case study. The use cases can be found in 
Appendix A. 
3. System Misuse Cases 
The system misuse cases describe how the system shall react to 
situations whereby the system is used incorrectly. In terms of safety, a system 
misuse case will typically focus on incorrect unintentional operation rather than 
malicious operation. However, depending on the type of system, malicious 
system misuse cases concerning safety will also be generated. Like the system 
use cases, they are not “fully-dressed,” but are sufficient for understanding the 
context in the case study. The system misuse cases can be found in Appendix A 
following the system use cases. 
4. System Description 
Based on the high-level user requirements, use cases and other user 
documentation, a basic description of the RASAM system can be found at 
Appendix A. The description covers the system components that enable required 




design phase. Typically, this would be accommodated by system requirements, 
or simply described through these requirements. However, for the purpose of this 
thesis, a simple description will suffice. 
5. Safety Artifacts 
During the conceptual/preliminary design, a Preliminary Hazard List 
(PHL), Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), generic safety requirements, derived 
safety requirements, and System Software Safety Requirements Traceability 
Matrix (SSSRTM) are each developed. These safety products can also be found 
in Appendix A. Each safety product would be expanded upon in subsequent 
design phases and, although they will technically not be “preliminary” following 
preliminary design, they will retain their nomenclature throughout the case study. 
These artifacts will be the subject of measurement throughout the system 
development, and, where necessary, will be updated throughout the 
development process. 
D. VALIDATION METRICS FRAMEWORK APPLICATION 
The application of the Validation Metrics Framework will vary depending 
on different factors influencing the goal structure. The safety team may enhance 
or change the core goal structure as presented in this thesis to suit the team’s 
particular application—it is extensible by nature. However, by at least using the 
framework as-is, a much more complete coverage of validation, aided by metrics, 
will be achieved than with current validation methods. During the conceptual 
design phase, most safety artifacts will focus on hazard identification. Some 
hazard analysis can be performed, and safety requirements derived, but lack of a 
full system design will prevent complete safety design. As the system matures 
throughout the lifecycle, a better understanding of system functionality, and 
subsequent safety analysis, is obtained. 
The safety product reference list consists of: 
1. RASAM Preliminary Hazard List. 
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2. RASAM Preliminary Hazard Analysis. 
3. RASAM Generic Safety Requirements. 
4. RASAM Derived Safety Requirements. 
5. RASAM SSSRTM. 
In accordance with the Validation Metrics Framework goal hierarchy 
shown in Figure 14, the following framework inputs can be identified for the 
RASAM system: 
- SDLP: Waterfall—requirements stability means that understanding 
of system functionality, and hence safety measures, will be 
obtained early in the development lifecycle. 
- Safety Inputs: As per safety product reference list above. 
- Stakeholder Feedback: Minimal due to SDLP; however, will still be 
an extremely important aspect of validation. Stakeholder feedback 
should be requested whenever metrics lead to investigations of 
validity. 
To reiterate, the overarching Framework Goal is: 
- Purpose: To measure the products of the software safety process 
throughout development and implementation in order to aid in 
validating software safety requirements. 
- Perspective: Examine the metrics from the safety engineering 
team’s point of view, with a focus on validating software safety 
requirements by proxy—in accordance with the proposed validation 
of safety requirements model. 
- Environment: The system has safety-critical elements that will be 
bound by the software safety process. 
1. Metric 1: Percent Software Hazards 
Utilizing the framework metrics identified in the previous chapter, we begin 
with Percent Software Hazards—ensuring that a sufficient number of hazards 
have been identified. The following table provides historical metric data from 
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previously developed similar systems.9 It includes the number of hazards 
identified for each and the number of software hazards derived. It is assumed 
that only “successful” systems (i.e., those perceived to be successful in the eyes 
of both the developer and customer) will be used for determining the model for 
M1. It must also be noted that the data presented here is obtained from the 
finalized system, not from early development phases. 
 
System # System Hazards # Software Hazards PSH 
RASAM v0.5 145 70 48.3% 
ISAM (Integrated 
SAM) 




95 34 35.8% 
AAMS10 (Air-Air 
Missile System)  
165 105 63.6% 
RAAMS (Rapid 
AAMS) 
198 104 52.5% 
Table 2.   Case Study PSH 
Based on the PSH for each system given in Table 2, the mean and 
standard deviation can be calculated. The standard deviation is given by using 
the root-mean-square (RMS) method assuming a complete population rather 
than a “sample” population. This results in a smaller deviation and therefore, 
according to previous definitions, a more sufficient number of identified hazards 
                                            
9 The data presented for the “similar” systems is representative of real systems, however, is 
fictitious. 
10 For the purpose of this thesis it is assumed that the Air-Air Missile System and the Rapid 
AAMS both have a similar level of software control, similar software safety development process, 
and similar hazard design space. 
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due to tighter boundaries.11 Also, it can be assumed that, where data is 
available, the entire population of available similar safety-critical software-
intensive systems would be used, rather than just a sample of the data. 
Metric 1 (M1) data is as follows: 
- EPSH = 49.1% 
- σ = 9.1%. 
At the end of the system design phase (final metric sample) the hazard 
identification process resulted in 180 system hazards being identified and 
recorded in the preliminary hazard identification document. Out of this 180 total 
hazards, 68 are directly associated with software control. Arriving at the number 
of 68 requires that Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) be performed, identifying 
which system hazards are directly influenced by software control. This figure 
does not look at lower-level software causal-factor hazards; rather, it is intended 
to ensure that a sufficient number of hazards are associated to software based 
on levels of software control and safety-criticality of similar systems. 
PSH = (68/180) * 100 = 37.8%. 
Using the data above, it can be shown that the RASAM PSH is outside of 
one standard deviation from the EPSH: 
|PSH – EPSH| = |37.8 – 49.1| = 11.3% > σ. 
Throughout the system development, the following data, summarized in 





                                            





# System Hazards # Software Hazards PSH 
1 140 20 14.3% 
2 164 45 27.4% 
3 171 67 39.2% 
4 180 68 37.8% 
Table 3.   RASAM PSH Samples 
Tracking M1 is best achieved by graphing each sample to monitor the 
growth, or reduction, of PSH.  
 
Figure 21.   RASAM PSH Growth 
 
Figure 21 indicates that the PSH has grown13 significantly as the system 
has progressed through the development lifecycle. This type of growth is 
                                            
12 The sample numbers represent samples taken at various stages of development as time 
progresses, i.e., sample 1 is taken before sample 2, etc. These sample numbers, and assumed 
positions in time, remain constant throughout the case study. 
13 Any reference to “growth” or “growth model” in this thesis refers to growth or reduction 
based directly on observed data. It does not consider predictive growth models. 
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expected as initially hazard identification will not identify which hazards are 
associated with software. After PHA we can expect the PSH to grow. Often the 
conceptual phase will not result in mature system data as the design is not well 
understood. This could be the reason for an initially insufficient number of 
software hazards being identified. However, growth from samples 1 through 3 
indicates that PSH is “on track.” Sample 4 shows a reduction in PSH, which is 
not expected. As it stands, the results of M1 indicate that further investigation 
needs to be made to determine the sufficiency of hazard identification, and hence 
the validity of the resulting requirements. The result may not be a cause for 
concern as it would be expected that the system would be better understood as it 
continues through the development lifecycle. Therefore the PSH may increase to 
a sufficient level. Regardless, an investigation must be conducted to determine 
the cause of the reduction and plan for the necessary action to guarantee growth 
into the sufficiency band (i.e., between minimum and maximum EPSH). 
2. Metric 2: Software Hazard Analysis Depth 
The data given in Table 3 provides a starting point for SHAD. This data 
indicates the total number of software hazards (causal factors) from which high- 
and medium- risk hazards must be obtained. Table 4 provides representative 










Hazard Analysis Depth Hazard Analysis Space (HAS) 






HASH = # High-Risk Software Hazards * 3 
HASH = 6 * 3 = 18 






HASM = # Medium Risk Software Hazards * 
3 
HASM = 5 * 3 = 15 
Table 4.   SHAD Data 
Utilizing the Hazard Analysis Achieved (HAA) data in the above table, the 
sum of HAA is shown below: 
High-Risk:   ∑HAA = 3 + 2 + 3 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 14. 
Medium Risk: ∑HAA = 2 + 3 + 2 + 2 + 3 = 12. 
Given HAA for each category, CH and CM can now be calculated: 
CH = [(∑HAAn) / HASH] * 100% = [14/18] * 100% = 78%. 
CM = [(∑HAAn) / HASMED] = [12/15] * 100% = 80%. 
SHAD can then be determined as the average of the two coverage metrics 
to give an overall coverage of the entire HAS (without a biased weighting to the 
high-risk category as it has a larger number of hazards): 
SHAD = (CH + CM)/2 = (78% + 80%) / 2 = 79%. 
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The first instance of SHAD is found to be 79%. As stated previously, 100% 
is an unrealistic figure (although possible). Therefore, 79% may prove to be a 
sufficient baseline. However, to prove sufficiency of this baseline figure, the 
safety team must ensure that the depth of analysis on each hazard has been 
performed adequately through investigation. 
Table 5 provides sample data for SHAD throughout the development of 
the RASAM system. 
M2 Sample # High-Risk # Med Risk CH CM SHAD 
1 6 5 78% 80% 79% 
2 10 12 73% 92% 82.5% 
3 15 20 67% 83% 75% 
4 18 21 89% 87% 88% 
Table 5.   SHAD Data Samples 
A combined graph of CH, CM and SHAD is shown in Figure 22 detailing the 
fluctuation in hazard analysis depth. 
 
Figure 22.   RASAM SHAD Growth 
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The above figure shows a distinct decline in SHAD at sample 3. At this 
same sample point there is a decline in both CH and CM. However, investigation 
into the cause of this decline would require determining the cause. From the 
graph, it can be assumed that correction took place prior to sample 4, resulting in 
an increase in SHAD. As discussed earlier, the SHAD metric will only provide 
indication of sufficiency for further investigation. 
3. Metric 3: Percent Software Safety Requirements 
Utilizing the same set of similar safety-critical software-intensive systems 
found at Metric 1, Table 6 shows data for the PSSR model. 
 
System # Software Requirements # Software Safety 
Requirements 
PSSR 
RASAM v0.5 94 25 26.6% 
ISAM (Integrated 
SAM) 




109 43 39.4% 
AAMS (Air-Air 
Missile System)  
120 56 46.7% 
RAAMS (Rapid 
AAMS) 
132 51 38.6% 




Based on the same assumptions made for M1 (complete population vs. 
sample of population), PSSR (M3) data is as follows: 
EPSSR = 38.2%. 
σ = 6.5%. 
At the end of the system design phase, the hazard identification and 
hazard analysis resulted in a total of 44 software safety requirements being 
derived. The total software requirements completed at the same time was 105. 
PSSR can be calculated as follows: 
PSSR = (44/105) * 100 = 41.9%. 
Analyzing the PSSR through the sufficiency model, it can be shown that, 
for the current number of software requirements, there are a sufficient number of 
software safety requirements: 
|PSSR – EPSSR| = |41.9 – 38.2| = 3.7% < σ. 
From the above data it can be assumed with reasonable confidence that a 
sufficient number of software safety requirements have been derived based on 
the current number of software requirements. Thus, this strengthens the 
validation case for the derived software safety requirements. 
In the same fashion as M1, a number of samples were taken throughout 
the conceptual design phase as shown in Table 7.  
 
M4 Sample # Software Requirements # Software Safety 
Requirements 
PSSR 
1 83 15 18% 
2 94 37 39.4% 
3 101 40 39.6% 
4 105 44 41.9% 
Table 7.   RASAM PSSR – Conceptual Phase 
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As with M1, tracking the growth or reduction of M3 is best achieved by 
graphing the results over time. This will aid in indicating maturing (or otherwise) 
valid software safety requirements. 
 
Figure 23.   RASAM PSSR Growth 
 
Figure 23 and the calculated PSSR, indicate a sufficient number of 
software safety requirements are being developed. Thus, instilling confidence 
that the safety requirements are indeed valid. 
4. Metric 4: Percent High-Risk Software Hazards with Safety 
Requirements 
It is assumed that M4 will be 100% throughout the development cycle; that 
is, every identified high-risk software hazard will be mitigated through appropriate 
software safety requirements. However, it is possible that certain elements of the 
design are forgotten, or postponed for later development. Therefore, it is 
important to ensure that every high-risk software hazard is associated with 
derived software safety requirements. The following table is the metric data used 
for M4, M5, and M6. 
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Sample # # SHHR-SR # SHHR # SHMR-SR # SHMR # SHMoR-SR # SHMoR 
1 2 4 5 14 7 8 
2 6 9 12 18 14 14 
3 10 11 23 24 19 20 
4 12 12 24 24 20 22 
Table 8.   Software Hazards with Safety Requirements Data 
Using the data given in Table 8, M4 can be calculated for the final sample 
as: 
M4 = (# SHHR-SR / # SHHR)*100 = (12/12)*100 = 100%. 
This result indicates that, at the end of the system design, all high-risk software 
hazards are associated with software safety requirements, indicating partial 
validity of the derived requirements. 
5. Metrics 5 & 6: Percent Medium Risk Software Hazards with 
Safety Requirements, and Percent Moderate Risk Software 
Hazards with Safety Requirements 
Following on from M4, M5 and M6 are simply extensions. Therefore, it will 
be more beneficial, and efficient, to combine all three metrics (M4, M5, and M6) 
into a single graphic. Using the metric data in Table 8, the following table shows 
the results of M4, M5, and M6 throughout development. 
Sample # M4 M5 M6 
1 50% 36% 88% 
2 67% 67% 100% 
3 91% 96% 95% 
4 100% 100% 91% 
Table 9.   Percent Software Hazards with Safety Requirements 
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Graphing the sample sets gives a more clear depiction of growth over time 
and indicates in one simple diagram which area (high-, medium-, or moderate- 
risk) of software safety requirements are sufficiently mitigated, and which areas 
of identified software hazards may be invalid. Overall, the metrics give an insight 
into the sufficiency of the artifacts resulting from the safety process, and hence 
the validity of the requirements. 
 
Figure 24.   M4, M5, and M6 Growth 
 
Figure 24 above indicates that all high- and medium-risk software hazards 
have associated software safety requirements. However, there are some 
moderate-risk software hazards that are not mitigated through software safety 
requirements. Therefore, investigation is required to determine either the validity 
of the software hazard, or the validity of the set of software safety requirements. 
6. Metric 7: Percent Software Safety Requirements Traceable to 
Hazards 
As with the previous three metrics (M4, M5 and M6), it is expected that all 
software requirements are traceable to hazards. In essence, the combination of 
M4, M5, M6, and M7 ensures forward and backward traceability. It may be the 
case that all software hazards have associated software safety requirements; 
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however, there is no guarantee that the complete set of derived software safety 
requirements is traceable to software hazards. At the end of system design it was 
found that, as with M3, the total number of software safety requirements was 44. 
Each of these software safety requirements was traceable to identified software 
hazards. Metric 7 calculations are as follows: 
M7 = (# SSRTR / # SSR)*100 = (44/44)*100 = 100%. 
Table 10 provides the metric data for M7 with the same four collection 
sample points as previous metrics. 
 
Sample # # SSRTR # SSR M7 
1 15 15 100% 
2 36 37 97.3% 
3 38 40 95% 
4 44 44 100% 
Table 10.   Traceable Software Safety Requirements Data 
 
Again, graphing over time gives us an indication of stability, or growth, or 
otherwise. In the case of M7, stability at 100% is the goal. Anything other than 
this would indicate the need for investigation. 
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Figure 25.   Percent Software Safety Requirements Traceability 
 
From the above metric data it is shown that, at the end of the system 
design, all software safety requirements are traceable to software hazards. This, 
again, strengthens the case that the derived software safety requirements are 
valid. 
E. CASE STUDY CONCLUSION 
In the above sections, the application of the Validation Metrics Framework 
has been demonstrated. As has been discussed, the metrics themselves cannot 
determine validity of the resultant safety artifacts (ultimately focusing on software 
safety requirements), but they do provide an indication of validity in a proactive 
manner. Instead of relying on final testing to reveal any validity issues with 
software safety requirements, application of the framework helps to identify 
potential problems early on in the development lifecycle. 
Upon finalization of system design in the case study, some metrics (M1, 
M2, and M6) indicate that further investigation must be made to determine the 
source of insufficiency, and the possibility of invalid software safety requirements. 
Throughout the development process, up to the final sample set, a number of 
investigations would have taken place to remedy, or understand, metrics 
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indicating poor performance of the assessed entity. Stakeholder feedback is 
necessary during these investigations, providing a closed-loop process for 
determining validity of software safety requirements. The case study only 
presents four sample sets of measurement data up to finalization of the system 
design. There is no “standard” number of samples that should be considered for 
system development; rather, it should be determined according to a number of 
factors, including but not limited to the following: 
- System complexity 
- Workforce 
- Metric performance (poor performance indicates the need for close 
monitoring and more regular samples) 
- Metric gathering burden 




A. KEY FINDINGS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
Validation as a concept is often misunderstood. Too often it is confused 
with verification activities, or left as a final box to tick just prior to delivery. Adding 
to this is the difficulty of validating software safety requirements. Validation of 
software safety requirements cannot be performed in the usual sense, which 
relies heavily on stakeholder input, because of the disconnect that exists 
between stakeholders specifying that they want a safe system and stakeholders 
understanding how to make a system safe. Ensuring that the right safety product 
is built is vital to the successful deployment and acceptance of a software 
system. When considering the possible impacts of a safety-critical software-
intensive system, validation of safety requirements is paramount. 
Validation of software safety requirements necessitates a new model of 
validation. Chapter III of this thesis proposed a new model for validation of safety 
requirements, focussing on sufficiency of hazard identification, hazard analysis, 
and software safety requirements traceability as a proxy for validation. This 
model forms the core of the proposed Validation Metrics Framework. 
At present very little information exists on the use of metrics for the 
purpose of measuring safety. Even less, if any, information can be obtained on 
metrics for validation. Discussion on what validation metrics are, and how best to 
use them, is given throughout this thesis. By combining two popular software 
development tools (GQM and GSN) we have created a goal-based framework 
identifying a core set of metrics to aid in validating safety requirements of safety-
critical software-intensive systems.  
The framework cannot be claimed to be complete. It is an initial step into a 
more mature software engineering environment utilizing measurement 
techniques. Rather than completeness, the framework should be considered in 
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terms of sufficiency. Sufficiency of the framework will depend on the application 
and surrounding organizational environment. Each organization will determine 
different levels of sufficiency based on a number of contributing factors, such as: 
- Experience with validation of software safety requirements 
- Experience with the framework itself 
- Organizational acceptance of a metrics framework 
- Overhead burden of gathering metrics 
- Complexity of the system under design 
- Relative success of previous designs. 
The Validation Metrics Framework has been designed in an extensible 
manner. Addition of new goals, questions, or metrics is not limited. Should better 
methods of measuring sufficiency of any one of the three elements of validation 
(i.e., hazard identification, hazard analysis, and software safety requirements 
traceability) be determined, the framework will allow for modification. Tailoring to 
suit any organization’s requirements is possible, but keep in mind that it is 
expected that in most cases this would involve an addition to the set of metrics. 
The metric set presented in the Validation Metrics Framework is given as a core 
set—they have been developed to be the minimum measures of sufficiency. 
However, this does not prevent partial application of the framework where 
benefits can be obtained. 
The research and development of this thesis resulted in a metric 
framework for validation of safety-critical software-intensive systems. There is 
currently no notion of validation metrics in the open literature, much less a 
framework identifying purpose, application, and boundaries of the metric set. 
Application of the framework to a representative safety-critical software-
intensive system (i.e., the RASAM) in Chapter V shows how the resulting metric 
data from the framework can engender a proactive approach to ensuring validity 
of software safety requirements. The Validation Metrics Framework identifies a 
number of areas that require investigation throughout the case study. Moreover 
the results of the case study demonstrated that the framework provides early 
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warnings of the invalidity of software safety requirements. As noted throughout 
the case study, the metrics cannot determine validity of the safety requirements 
themselves. Instead they serve as indicators (in some cases early indicators) of 
software safety requirements validity. Only subsequent investigation, triggered by 
the metrics in the framework, can determine if the software safety requirements 
are in fact valid. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The primary avenue of future work is to apply the Validation Metrics 
Framework to a number of real systems under development. Although a metric 
for effectiveness of applying the framework has not been identified, a survey 
could be used to determine effectiveness as perceived by both developers and 
stakeholders. Establishing effectiveness via perception would provide justification 
for application and provide a firm grounding for continued use and development 
of the Validation Metrics Framework. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, a metric to measure the 
effectiveness of the framework has not been identified. Initially a qualitative 
metric should be developed with an aim to move to an automated quantitative 
metric. Effectively, a Return On Investment (ROI) style quantitative metric is 
required to provide even further justification for the framework. The ROI metric 
may only consider resources as measures of success. Thus, a qualitative metric 
is still required to determine effectiveness in terms of validity (as per the previous 
paragraph). Therefore, a two-part metric is required to measure effectiveness of 
the framework—a quantitative ROI portion (concerned with resources) and a 
qualitative portion rating the perceived effectiveness. 
At present, the framework determines validity of safety requirements 
through sufficiency measures. Although carefully researched, it is expected that 
more appropriate and effective sufficiency measures may be identified that still 
maintain the core goal-set as identified through this thesis. Application of the 
framework to real systems will most likely result in improvements to the current 
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core metric set, or identify new metrics. There are likely to be many other ways to 
measure sufficiency than those proposed in this thesis. 
The current Validation Metrics Framework specifically addresses safety-
critical software-intensive systems. Many safety-critical system developers are 
now moving toward system-of-systems solutions. The aim of these solutions is to 
leverage off previous development (in many cases) while creating an overall 
system that has capability beyond the “sum of its parts” (i.e., synergy of 
systems). Designing safety into a system-of-systems can be a much more 
complex task than that of standard systems. Until recently, hazard identification 
and hazard analysis methods were unable to deal with system-of-systems (see 
[26] for a detailed analysis of the system-of-systems problem when identifying 
and analyzing safety hazards). Redmond proposes an interface hazard analysis 
technique for systems-of-systems and identifies a number of other hazard 
identification and analysis areas as future work. The Validation Metrics 
Framework is highly reliant on the methods of identifying and analyzing hazards. 
Therefore, a complete hazard analysis method is required for systems-of-
systems before applying the framework to systems-of-systems. Because these 
types of systems are only recent advances in software engineering, success of 
design has been varied. For many of the metrics identified in the Validation 
Metrics Framework, historic data is required from successful systems to ensure 
valid metric interpretation. Presently, this historical data is not readily available. 
Therefore, when dealing with system-of-systems solutions, two hurdles must be 
cleared: 
- Maturing of hazard identification and analysis 
- Compilation of historical metric data. 
Once the above objectives are met, there is no foreseeable reason why 
the Validation Metrics Framework cannot be applied with the current metric set. 
This application will require further investigation to define clear-cut processes 
and definitions (e.g., there may be two different system specifications resulting in 
a complex web of requirements traceability, but still needs to be maintained). 
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The Validation Metrics Framework is specific for safety-critical software-
intensive systems. Through the development of this framework, a hybrid generic 
metrics model has also been identified through the combination of GQM and 
GSN. This hybrid model provides all the advantages of a goal-based metric 
framework, while extending the GQM structure to include more descriptive 
elements from GSN. The Validation Metrics Framework for safety-critical 
software-intensive systems is one example of a validation metrics framework. 
Future derivatives of the proposed framework could result in validation metrics 
frameworks for nearly any requirement type or validation aspect. The basic 
hybrid model is extensible and therefore could also be used for metric 
frameworks even beyond the realms of validation, for instance verification. 
Discussed during the objectives section for the Validation Metrics 
Framework is the concept of providing a goal ranking system. Because 
resources are not always plentiful, a realistic view of goal ranking (and 
subsequent metric ranking) is required. A number of possible solutions exist for 
goal ranking; however, the method of Berander and Jönsson [19] seems 
promising. Allowing for surveyed prioritization could be an initial implementation, 
while working toward a more complete solution that takes into account severity of 
risks and other factors. In fact, any ranking surveys undertaken need to clearly 
explain the consequences of rating a certain goal too low. Neglect on any metric 
that deals directly with high-risk software could result in severely invalid software 
safety requirements. Future development and research on the Validation Metrics 
Framework needs to consider prioritization as an integral part of the framework, 
otherwise the risk of rejecting the framework due to lack of resources is 
heightened. 
Software reuse is another hotly debated topic in the software engineering 
community. Although it has not been discussed in depth, the reality is that 
software reuse can deliver benefits to developers of software-intensive systems. 
It can also result in severe complications during design and failures after delivery. 
However, given that there is much to be gained from software reuse, it makes 
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sense that any metric framework for modern software-intensive systems should 
consider its impact. Future development of the Validation Metrics Framework 
should include analysis of the impact that software reuse can potentially have. 
Given that the framework is used for validation of software safety requirements, 
the impact on requirements due to software reuse will be the focus. As part of 
this analysis, a sufficient method of managing software reuse should be 
recommended to bound the possibilities of design artifacts and procedures. 
Warren presents a suitable framework for software reuse in safety-critical system 
of systems called C5RA [27]. 
Automation of the Validation Metrics Framework is also an important 
aspect. To reduce the burden on metric gathering, tools should be developed to 
gather, monitor, and regularly report on the framework metrics. To a great extent, 
automation of the framework can be achieved. However, the intellectual 
activities—tailoring the framework and conducting investigations into validity of 
requirements—cannot be automated. 
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APPENDIX A. RASAM DESIGN ARTIFACTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The documentation compiled in this section is only intended to be 
representative of an actual system. It is not a complete representation. Sufficient 
data is provided so that the context is clear; however, when the metrics are 
presented for the RASAM, the results will not correlate directly with the 
information below. For example, there are only seven safety requirements 
identified and fourteen hazards. Not every hazard will be addressed through the 
shown requirements, though the metrics shown will assume representative data. 
The purpose is to show how the framework is used, not to fully define a software-
intensive system. 
Format and content of the following design artifacts will vary depending on 
the application and/or originator. However, the purpose and context of the 
documentation will be similar to that given below. 
Obtaining metric data, where possible, should be an automated process. 
This will reduce the overhead burden on any metric program. In most cases, 
some form of CM tool would be used to obtain this information, and therefore 
would be in a much more organized fashion than the form below. 
B. SYSTEM USE CASES 
1. UC1 – Command & Control (C&C) Interfaced RASAM Launch 
Scope: RASAM System. 
Level: User-Goal. 




Stakeholders and Interests:  
- C&C Operator – Wants successful launch and kill of target. 
- Weapon crew – Does not want to engage with RASAM unless 
ammunition depleted. 
Preconditions:  
- RASAM interfaced with C&C system. 
- Built In Tests (BITs) passed. 
- RASAM in tactical mode. 
- C&C recognized air/surface picture valid. 
- RASAM loader contains sufficient munitions. 
Success Guarantee: RASAM launches without incident and achieves Pk 
of > 0.975 for dual salvo against designated threat within designed 
capabilities. 
Main Success Scenario: 
1. User identifies enemy target on C&C system. 
2. User initiates RASAM launch through C&C system on identified 
enemy target. 
3. RASAM receives launch command and initiates launch. 
4. RASAM deploys dual-salvo attack. 
5. C&C system continuously updates target position to RASAM 
system. 
6. RASAM system relays target position to launched munitions. 
7. Munitions match position and lock to detected vessels when within 
range of detection. 
8. Munitions impact and destroy target. 
Extensions (Alternates): 
*.  User may, at any stage throughout Main Success Scenario, abort 
attack: 
a. User issues abort command through C&C system. 
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b. RASAM receives abort command and initiates abort 
procedure. 
c. If safe to do so, munitions are destroyed in flight. 
d. If flight path does not allow for safe self-destruct, RASAM 
issues new coordinates and enables self-destruct of 
munitions. 
6. Should communication to munitions fail, missile will disarm, de-
energize propulsion, and ground. 
7. Should position mismatch occur (i.e., relayed position not match 
detected vessels) from detection range to 1km from detected 
vessels or C&C target (whichever is closer), error shall be sent to 
RASAM and missile shall disarm, de-energize propulsion, and 
ground. 
8. Should missiles fail to impact target (only if neither missile impacts):  
a. Missile shall attempt to re-track and engage target until 
onboard fuel < 5% but not < 4%.  
b. Missile shall self destruct if fuel load between 4% and 5% if 
no impact and if safe to do. 
c. If not safe to self-destruct, RASAM issues new coordinates 
and enables self-destruct of munitions. 
8. Should one missile impact and not the other, non-impacting missile 
shall detonate within 50m of other missiles impact. 
2. UC2 – Launcher Reload 
Scope: RASAM System. 
Level: User-Goal. 
Primary Actor: Weapon Crew. 
Stakeholders and Interests:  
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- C&C Operator – Wants fast reload of munitions, initiates reload 
request. 
- Weapon crew – Wants easy and simple reload procedure to allow 
for coordinated reload. 
Preconditions:  
- RASAM interfaced with C&C system. 
- Munitions depleted and signaled to C&C Operator. 
- RASAM in standby mode. 
- Spare launcher sub-assembly positioned for reload. 
- Spare launcher sub-assembly BITs passed. 
Success Guarantee: Weapon crew (consisting of at least three 
members) is able to reload RASAM (twenty missiles) in less than thirty 
seconds and signal for return to required mode. 
Main Success Scenario: 
1. C&C Operator requests munitions reload. 
2. Weapon crew receives reload request. 
3. Weapon crew checks RASAM in standby mode and initiate reload. 
4. RASAM lowers depleted launcher sub-assembly. 
5. Weapon crew extracts depleted launcher and insert new launcher. 
6. Weapon crew activates reload insert. 
7. RASAM loads new launcher and initiates reload BITs. 
8. RASAM signals C&C operator that reload BITs passed. 
Extensions (Alternates): 
8. Should the reload BITs not pass, the RASAM should signal the 
C&C operator and prevent from entering tactical mode. 
*. The RASAM shall not change from standby mode throughout the 
whole reload procedure, and should not change mode until 
explicitly called upon completion of the procedure. 
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C. SYSTEM MISUSE CASES 
The following misuse case details a sequence of actions that could lead to 
incorrect target designation. This example of misuse case would be created in 
the conceptual design of the system, identifying many of the potential system 
hazards that need to occur to allow such a safety incident. Misuse cases are the 
primary identifier of system hazards (then recorded in PHL), and also a form of 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis. However, they are intended to be rudimentary 
starting points, not detailed analysis tools. 
1. MUC1—Incorrect Target Designation 
Scope: RASAM System. 
Level: User-Goal. 
Primary Actor: C&C Operator (referred to as “User” in Main Success 
Scenario), C&C System. 
Stakeholders and Disinterests:  
- C&C Operator – Does not identify incorrect designation. 
- C&C System – Identifies incorrect target. 
Preconditions:  
- RASAM interfaced with C&C system. 
- BITs passed. 
- RASAM in tactical mode. 
- C&C recognized air/surface picture valid. 
- RASAM loader contains sufficient munitions. 
Failure Guarantee: RASAM identifies target according to C&C 
identification without rejection of incorrect designation. 
Main Success Scenario: 
1. User incorrectly identifies friendly as enemy target on C&C system. 
2. C&C system allows incorrect designation: 
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a. C&C does not retain Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) coding 
for target, or 
b. If C&C does not have IFF coding, does not interrogate for 
update. 
3. User initiates RASAM launch through C&C system on incorrectly 
identified enemy target. 
4. RASAM receives launch command and initiates launch. 
5. RASAM does not perform any IFF interrogation on target 
throughout launch procedure. 
Extensions (Alternates): 
*.  User may, at any stage throughout main success scenario, abort 
attack: 
a. User issues abort command through C&C system. 
b. RASAM receives abort command and initiates abort 
procedure. 
*a.  User may, at any stage throughout main success scenario, re-identify 
the target: 
a. User issues re-identification. 
b. C&C passes to RASAM. 
c. RASAM receives update and re-identifies, whilst maintaining 
history of target. 
D. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The following system description serves as background information to 
provide further context to the RASAM example.  
The RASAM design consists of three major subsystems: 
- Launcher Subsystem, 
- RASAM Missile, and 
- Weapon Control System (WCS). 
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The RASAM also consists of three major ancillary equipment subsystems: 
- Loader, 
- Launcher Interface Test Kit, and 
- Missile Interface Test Kit. 
1. WCS 
The WCS interfaces to the host command and control system via optical 
fiber: 
- The C&C type can vary according to ship class. 
- Accepts target designations and engagement orders from C&C. 
- Issues commands to Launcher Subsystem to prepare and launch 
missile 
The major subsystems of the WCS are: 
- Interface Adapter Panel (IAP) 
o Interfaces to host combat system 
o Interfaces to shipboard sensors 
o Formats message traffic for SCU. 
- Weapon Control Panel (WCP) 
o Operator interface 
o Select operational mode (off, standby, test, training, tactical) 
o Weapon Control for stand-alone operations. 
- Launcher Interface Unit (LIU) 
o Interfaces WCS to Launcher. 
- System Control Unit (SCU) 
o Monitors and controls all system functions 
o Provides feedback to the operator on system status. 
2. Launcher 
The launcher subsystem has ready-service stowage for twenty missiles: 
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- Restrain missiles in launcher against ship’s motion up to sea-state 
6 
- Prepare, point, and fire missiles in direction of threat 
- Protect missiles from effects of shipboard environment. 
The major subsystems of the Launcher subsystem are: 
- Launcher 
o Stores and protects missiles 
o Positions missiles for firing. 
- Launcher Control System (LCS) 
o Controls train and elevation of launcher. 
- Missile Interface Assembly (MIA) 
o Interface between WCS and missiles. 
3. RASAM Missile 
The RASAM Missile is not a unique component, therefore can be 












E. SAFETY PRODUCT REFERENCE LIST 
Date Name Version
10Apr2004 RASAM Preliminary Hazard List V1 
15Jul2004 RASAM Preliminary Hazard List V2 
15Jul2004 RASAM Preliminary Hazard Analysis V1 
12Oct2004 RASAM Preliminary Hazard Analysis V2 
30Nov2004 RASAM Generic Safety Requirements V1 
10Jan2005 RASAM Derived Safety Requirements V1 
15Feb2005 RASAM Software Safety Requirements Traceability 
Matrix 
V1 
Table 11.   RASAM Safety Product Reference List 
F. RASAM PHL 
Identifier Date Hazard Comments 





H2 10Apr2004 Explosion or deflagration of 
rocket motor 
 
H3 10Apr2004 Loss of control of launched 
missile 
 
H4 10Apr2004 Loss of control of launcher 
movement 
 




Identifier Date Hazard Comments 




H7 10Apr2004 Exposed toxic materials  
H8 10Apr2004 Launch debris Ejected 
components 
H9 20May2004 Unintentional launch  
H10 20May2004 RASAM / C&C position 
discrepancy 
 
H11 15Jun2004 Loss of communication with 
launched missile 
 
H12 23Jun2004 Loss of communication between 
C&C and RASAM 
 





H14 15Jul2004 Incorrect target designation Highly dependent 
on C&C system, 
but not entirely 
Table 12.   RASAM Preliminary Hazard List 
G. RASAM PHA 
For the purpose of this thesis, the PHA will only be presented in terms of 
mishap risk associated with each of the hazards. In a full PHA, a much deeper 
analysis of each potential mishap would be performed—including mishap risk, 
determination of causal factors (in themselves hazards), and suggested 
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mitigation techniques—all leading to derived safety requirements. For this thesis, 
these underlying steps are assumed to have contributed to the mishap risk table 
below and subsequent safety requirements. The mishap risk is determined 
according to the resultant mishap and then carried over to the associated 
hazard(s). Mishap risk will be determined in accordance with the Joint Software 
System Safety Committee Software System Safety Handbook [2], utilizing the 
hazard severity and hazard probability to determine a Hazard Risk Index (HRI) 
rating whilst using engineering judgment to combine risk elements of software 
using the Software Hazard Criticality Matrix (SHCM). 
 
ID Date Severity Probability HRI Comments 
15Jul04 Catastrophic Frequent 1 Unacceptable risk. 
Safety requirements to 
lower risk.  
H1 
30Sep04 Catastrophic Probable 2 Risk lowered after 
review by SME, 
software control level 
lower than anticipated. 
15Jul04 Catastrophic Remote 8 Marginal risk. Based on 
current rocket motor 
success. 
H2 
10Oct04 Catastrophic Improbable 10 Minimum risk. Risk 
lowered after review by 
SME. 
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ID Date Severity Probability HRI Comments 
15Jul04 Catastrophic Occasional 4 Unacceptable risk. 
Current SAM systems 
not as software-
intensive as RASAM. 
Safety requirements to 
lower risk. 
H3 
08Oct04 Catastrophic Probable 2 Risk raised after 
comparison to current 
non-software-intensive 
systems. Safety 
requirements not yet 
sufficient. 
H4 15Jul04 Critical Occasional 6 Marginal risk. Based on 
current launcher 
technology. RASAM 
involves more software 
control. 
H5 15Jul04 Critical Remote 12 Minimum risk. Based on 
current electrical safety 
technologies. 
H6 15Jul04 Critical Improbable 15 Minimum risk. Assumes 
trained maintenance 
personnel. 
H7 15Jul04 Catastrophic Remote 8 Marginal risk. Based on 
current toxic material 
containment. 
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ID Date Severity Probability HRI Comments 
H8 15Jul04 Critical Remote 12 Minimum risk. Remote 
possibility that 
personnel will be near 
debris. Equipment and 
environment not 
affected. 
15Jul04 Catastrophic Probable 2 Unacceptable risk. 
Safety requirements to 
reduce risk. 
H9 
09Aug04 Catastrophic Occasional 4 Risk lowered after 
preliminary safety 
requirements reviewed. 
15Jul04 Catastrophic Occasional 4 Unacceptable risk. 




25Jul04 Catastrophic Probable 2 Risk raised due to 
review by SME. 
H1
1 
15Jul04 Catastrophic Probable 2 Unacceptable risk. 




15Jul04 Catastrophic Probable 2 Unacceptable risk. 








ID Date Severity Probability HRI Comments 
H1
4 
15Jul04 Catastrophic Probable 2 Unacceptable risk. 
Based on current SAM 
systems. 
Table 13.   RASAM Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
H. RASAM SOFTWARE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
The results of the PHA typically identify the preliminary system 
components that can contribute to mishaps/hazards. It has been assumed that, 
without explicitly undertaking an analysis method (Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, etc.) in this thesis, the results 
of such a method are available. Therefore, the safety-critical system components 
have been identified and the following safety requirements are developed to 
reduce the probability of causal factors contributing to the mishap. Again, this will 
not be a “complete” exercise, it will only illustrate a portion of safety 
requirements. As this documentation is being formed in the conceptual design 
phase, sufficient design knowledge is not present to sufficiently identify software 
safety requirements. This will be conducted during the following design phases. 
The following requirements are derived safety requirements (Safety 
Derived – SDn) identified to directly address hazard H9 and partially H14: 
SD.1. WCS shall maintain positive control of launch-related commands. 
SD.2. The design of the interfaces shall reduce the probability of 
erroneous target designation and launch-related messages due to one-, two-, or 
three-bit errors to <1x10-9. 
SD.3. The LSC design shall verify the correct sequence of launch related 
commands. 
SD.4. The WCS shall validate target designation commands from C&C. 
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SD.5. The LSC shall verify safety-related interlocks prior to complying with 
launch related orders. 
In order to address the probability of hazard H1 occurring unintentionally, 
the following generic safety requirement (Safety Generic – SGn) is identified:  
SG.1. Warhead fuze design shall be in accordance with MIL-STD-1316: 
Safety Criteria for Fuze Design. 
Addressing the probability of hazard H2, the following generic safety 
requirement is identified: 
SG.2. Rocket propulsion system shall be designed in accordance with 
MIL-STD-1901A: Safety Criteria for Munition Rocket and Missile Motor Ignition 
System Design. 
I. RASAM SSRTM 
Although the above requirements are not yet specific “software” 
requirements, they will form the basis of the SSRTM. In fact, these requirements 
will form the System Safety Requirements Traceability Matrix from which the 
Software Safety Requirements Traceability Matrix will be defined. The following 
matrix will be in the same form as the SSRTM, it will simply not yet address 









Safety Rq. ID Hazard ID Op. Rq. ID 
SD1 H9 OR4, OR6, OR8 
SD2 H9 OR3, OR4, OR7, OR8 
SD3 H9 OR6, OR8 
SD4 H9, H14 OR3, OR4, OR7, OR8 
SD5 H9 OR7, OR8 
SG1 H9 ORn 
SG2 H9 ORn 
Table 14.   RASAM SSRTM 
The above SSRTM is only a rudimentary example. The key element is that 
traceability from any given safety requirement can be made back to identified 
hazards. At this stage of development, it can usually be assumed that the 
identified hazards are valid themselves. The processes (misuse cases, previous 
experience) used to identify the hazards, along with application of this 
framework, will contribute to validity of the hazards. Traceability in the safety 
sense primarily considers traceability to an identified hazard which is then 
traceable (through the analysis and identification methods) to system 
functionality. 
 119
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1]  MIL-STD-882D, Standard Practice for System Safety, DoD, 2000. 
[2]  Joint Software System Safety Committee, Software System Safety 
Handbook: A Technical and Managerial Team Approach, Joint Services 
Computer Resource Management Group, U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, U.S. Air 
Force, 1999. 
[3]  Institut de l’Audiovisuel et des Télécommunications en Europe, Software 
intensive systems in the future, version 5, September 2005, pg 5. 
[4]  IEEE Std. 1012-2004, IEEE Standard for Software Verification and 
Validation, IEEE, 2004. 
[5]  B. S. Blanchard, and W. J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 
4th Edition, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006. 
[6]  D. Drusinsky, J.B. Michael and M. Shing, A Framework for Computer-
Aided Validation, Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering, 4(2), 
pp. 161 - 168, June 2008. 
[7]  IEEE Std 610.12-1990, IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering 
Terminology, IEEE 1990. 
[8]  J. C. Munson, Software Engineering Measurement, Auerbach 
Publications, 2003. 
[9]  M. W. Whalen, M. P. E. Heimdahl, A. Rajan, S. P. Miller, “Coverage 
Metrics for Requirements-Based Testing,” ISSTA, pp. 25 – 35, 2006. 
[10]  S. Tasiran and K. Keutzer, “Coverage Metrics for Functional Validation of 
Hardware Designs,” IEEE Design and Test of Computers, July – August, 
2001. 
[11]  P. J. Pingree, E. Mikk, G. J. Holzmann, M. H. Smith, and D. Dams, 
“Validation of Mission Critical Software Design and Implementation Using 
Model Checking,” IEEE, 2002. 
[12]  J. Wing, “A Specifier’s Introduction to Formal Methods,” IEEE Computer, 
vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 8-24, September 1990. 
[13] B. Boehm and P. Bose, A Collaborative Spiral Software Process Model 
Based on Theory W, Proceedings of the Third International Conference on 
the Software Process, 1994, pp 59 – 68. 
 120
[14]  N. Leveson, Safeware: System Safety and Computers, Addison-Wesley, 
1995, pp 29, 249 – 260, 359. 
[15]  R. Weaver, “The Safety of Software – Constructing and Assuring 
Arguments,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of York, Department of 
Computer Science, September 2003, pp 81- 85. 
[16]  K. Gödel, Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia mathematica 
und verwandter Systeme I. Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik 38, 
pp. 173 – 198, 1931. 
[17]  V. R. Basili, G. Caldiera and H. Dieter Rombach, “The Goal Question 
Metric Approach,” in Encyclopedia of Software Engineering, Vol. 1, John 
Wiley & Sons, 1994, pp. 528-532. 
[18]  V. R. Basili and D. M. Weiss, “A Methodology for Collecting Valid Software 
Engineering Data,” IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. SE-
10, no. 6, pp. 728-738, November 1984. 
[19]  P. Berander and P. Jnsson, A Goal Question Metric Based Approach for 
Efficient Measurement Framework Definition. Proceedings of the 
International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering, September 
2006. 
[20]  V. R. Basili and H. D. Rombach, “The TAME Project: Towards 
Improvement-Oriented Software Environments,” IEEE Transactions on 
Software Engineering, vol. SE-14, no. 6, pp. 758 – 753, June 1988. 
[21]  W. Royce, Managing the Development of Large Software Systems, 
Proceedings of IEEE WESCON, pp. 1–9, August 1970. 
[22]  B. Boehm, A Spiral Model of Software Development and Enhancement, 
IEEE Computer, May 1988, pp. 61 – 72. 
[23]  C. Larman, Applying UML and Patterns: An Introduction to Object-
Oriented Analysis and Design and Iterative Development, Third Edition, 
Prentice Hall PTR, 2005. 
[24]  R. Weaver, J. Fenn, and T. Kelly, “A Pragmatic Approach to Reasoning 
about the Assurance of Safety Arguments,” in proceedings of the 8th 
Australian Workshop on Safety Critical Systems and Software (SCS’03), 
Canberra, 2003, vol. 33, pp. 57 – 67. 
[25]  V. Basili, K. Dangle, L. Esker, and F. Marotta, “Gaining Early Insight into 
Software Safety: Measures of Potential Problems and Risks,” presented at 
Systems and Software Technology Conference, June 2007. 
 121
[26]  P. Redmond, “A System of Systems Interface Hazard Analysis 
Technique,” M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
March 2007. 
[27]  B. Warren, “A Framework For Software Reuse In Safety-Critical System of 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 123
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Library 
Australian Defence Force Academy 
Cambell, Australian Capital Territory, Australia 
 
4. Squadron Leader Derek Reinhardt 
Royal Australian Air Force 
RAAF Williams, Laverton, Australia 
 
5. Mr Arch McKinlay 
Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity 
Indiana Head, Maryland 
 
6. Professor Bret Michael 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7. Professor Man-Tak Shing 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
8. Dr. Tim Kelly 
University of York 
Heslington, York, United Kingdom 
 
9. Dr. Rob Weaver 
University of York 
Heslington, York, United Kingdom 
 
10. Mr. Michael Brown 
EG&G Technical Services, Inc. 
Fresno, California 
 
11. Mr. Marcus Fisher 
NASA IV&V Facility 
Fairmont, West Virginia 
 124
12. Mr. Wee Kok Ling 
Defense Science & Technology Agency 
Singapore 
 
13. Mr. Mark Wessman 
Wessman Consultancy Group, Inc. 
Springfield, Virginia 
 
14. Mr. Lim Horng Leong 
Defense Science & Technology Agency 
Singapore 
 
15. Mr. Nickolas Guertin 
NAVSEA, PEO IWS 7 
Washington Navy Yard, DC 
 
16. Mr. John Harauz 
Jonic Systems Engineering, Inc. 
Willlowdale, Ontario, Canada 
 
17. Dr. Butch Caffall 
NASA IV&V Facility 
Fairmont, West Virginia 
 
